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Abstract
Non-governmental organizations (NGO) have the reputation for being benevolent
organizations that help populations in need. Globally, these organizations promote this particular
image to the public, but international NGOs also often work in tandem with other neo-colonial
structure systems to maintain Western domination over poor and underdeveloped countries in
Africa and elsewhere. This thesis looks at this phenomenon through the lens of French neocolonialism and the Françafrique regime to study the extent to which French NGOs participate in
this neo-colonial system in Francophone West Africa. Using interview data and data collected
from the European Commission’s ECHO, this thesis looks at the role that donor funding and
bureaucratization play in upholding neo-colonial structure systems and values. Additionally, I
identify certain human elements related to insensitivity, Western superiority, and paths for the
future. This thesis finds that, knowingly or not, French NGOs participate in this neo-colonial
system through the creation of dependency structures, lack of technological development, and
the prioritization of the superiority of Western values in Francophone West Africa.
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Abbreviations
ACF

Action contre la faim

ACTED

Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development

AFD

Agence française de développement

CSO

Civil Society Organization

ECHO

Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and
Humanitarian Aid Operations (European Community
Humanitarian Aid Office)

HI

Humanity and Inclusion (Handicap International)

ICR

International Refugee Committee

IMF

International Monetary Fund

INGO

International non-governmental organization

NDGO

Non-governmental development organization
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NGO

Non-governmental organization

MDM

Médecins du monde

MNC

Multinational corporation

MSF

Médecins sans frontières

PAM

Programme alimentaire mondiale (see WFP)

SAP

Structural Adjustment Program

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

WFP

World Food Program

WTO

World Trade Organization

Chapter 1: Introduction
Non-governmental organizations (NGO) have the reputation of being benevolent, moral,
and necessary to address issues outside the purview of governments and politics. This perception
about the success of these organizations is promoted by the very NGOs themselves through
publications, annual reports, and reputations. By and large, the international community accepts
and legitimizes NGOs. An example of this is Médecins sans frontières’ winning the Nobel Peace
Prize in 1999. However, humanitarian aid is more complex than the reputations that these
organizations portray, and it exists in a larger framework that benefits Western interests. When
many countries in Africa gained independence in the early 1960s, they were not completely
independent and ex-colonial powers continued to exert political and economic influence. Years
of exploitation rendered these countries poor and less developed when compared to
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industrialized Western nations. This outside intervention in politics, economics, and general
internal affairs of newly-independent countries in Africa became understood as neo-colonialism.
When looking at the ties that European powers maintained with their ex-colonies, France
in particular established a very tight relationship with its former colonies. Through the
establishment of the Françafrique regime, France maintained control through military, political,
economic, and linguistic means. France controlled the two currencies used in Western and
Central Africa, which benefited the metropole economically. France’s relationship with its
former colonies was much more overt than the relationships that Great Britain and other
European powers maintained with their former colonies. Due to the unique structure of French
colonialism and neo-colonialism, this project asks: to what extent do the actions of French NGOs
in Francophone West Africa uphold previous neo-colonial values and structure systems? By
studying French NGOs, this project aims to understand how these nonstate actors operate in
Francophone West African countries, particularly with respect to the Françafrique regime.
I. Research Motivations
This honors project is a result of many courses taken on the subjects of African politics,
international relations, African literature, and history. I been very interested in learning about
Africa through many different lenses. During my Senior year in high school, I took a political
theory course that ended in a study of neoliberalism and the global inequalities established as a
result of Western economic domination and free markets. I was struck by these inequalities, and
desired to learn more about their causes, effects on local populations, and how they affect
different institutions. At Colby, I continued studying French and elected to become a French
major. Through courses offered by Professor Mouhamedoul Niang, I read francophone African
literature, historical texts, and anthropological essays. We studied different cultures, watched
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films, and looked at local perspectives to conflict, Western involvement, and other issues facing
different communities in Africa. The courses I took with Professor Niang informed much of my
desire to pursue this topic, which is a mix between international relations, comparative politics,
and studies of the African continent. In pursuing this project, I hope to gain better understanding
about the actions of NGOs and see if any viable options exist for change in the future.
II. Historical Context
During the colonial period, France maintained a particular relationship between the
metropole and its colonies that was based on the mission civilisatrice, or civilizing mission. The
secular mission civilisatrice grew from French republican ideals but also rested on the belief in
the fundamental superiority of French culture, as well as the perfectibility of humankind. It also
implied that colonial subjects were too primitive and barbaric to rule themselves, but France
colonialism was capable of uplifting them (Conklin 1997). This mindset guided French colonial
policy toward its colonies. Thus, France established tight control and maintained extremely close
relationships with the organization and operation of its colonies. Economically, the CFA franc,
which was imposed by France, tied West Africa to the world market on unequal terms (Conklin
1997). France also built schools, invested in infrastructure, and worked to extend certain moral
elements of French republicanism. France also believed in the idea of assimilation, wherein
French colonies would eventually be one with France (Smith 1978). In comparison to British
colonial rule, which rested on the idea of ‘informal empire,’ France established very close ties
with its colonies.
When colonized regions in Africa moved toward colonization, the French were
significantly less prepared than the British. During the move towards independence, France did
not establish a sound plan to facilitate the move toward independence. As Tony Smith describes,
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“by deciding with whom they would negotiate, by what procedure they would institutionalize the
transfer of power, and over what territory the new regime would rule, Paris and London
decisively influenced the course of decolonization” (Smith 1978). When France relinquished its
colonies in West Africa, the transitions of power were relatively seamless compared to those in
other French colonies, like Algeria and Indochina (now Vietnam). However, the governments of
many newly independent countries had been directly influenced by the French. Thus, the true
level of independence was negligible, and France was able to maintain its close ties and continue
economic exploitation. Directly following independence, France remained involved and
controlled many aspects of the political and economic development of its former colonies.
III. Literature Review
Introduction to the Literature
This section provides an overview of the literature on neo-colonialism, non-governmental
organizations, and NGOs as neocolonial actors. The review begins with analyzing neocolonialism and its effects on African development, particularly during the era of globalization
and market liberalization. It traces the imperialist activities performed by Western liberal
countries, both through the neoliberal and neo-colonial lens. This section then moves onto an
analysis of NGOs on the global stage with respect to development and humanitarianism, as well
as the complicated relationship between donors and NGOs. I then outline the particularities of
the relationship between the French state and the nonprofit sector. Finally, this literature review
discusses the gaps in the literature and will propose how to analyze French NGOs as neocolonial actors in Western Francophone Africa.
Neo-Colonialism in Africa
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International involvement in African politics, economies, and civil societies never
disappeared after most African countries gained independence nearly 60 years ago. Instead,
colonialism merely “left through the front door and returned through the back door” to establish
a new order of imperial dominance, namely that of neo-colonialism (Shivji, 2006c). As Kwame
Nkrumah writes, “the neo-colonialism of today represents imperialism in its final and perhaps its
most dangerous stage” (Nkrumah 1965). Rather than breaking ties with former colonies,
European powers continued to extract valuable natural resources, trade benefits, and political
ties. As Nkrumah explains, neo-colonialism is characterized by the phenomenon wherein the
State, which is subject to neo-colonialism, is independent and sovereign in theory, but “its
economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside” (Nkrumah 1965). Neocolonialism at its origin allowed former colonial powers to maintain economic and political ties
with its former colonies in order to extract resources and dictate economic development within
the countries through military presence and strong economic ties.
African economies were intentionally kept weak by the imperialist colonial powers, thus
allowing European countries to exploit the resources of new African countries after
independence. Neo-colonialism upheld and reinforced many of the dependence structures that
existed during the colonial period. As Nkrumah explains, neo-colonialism was based upon the
division of large former colonial territories into small states that lacked the tools necessary for
independent development, thus forcing these new states to rely on the former imperial power for
defense and internal security. Thus, “their economic and financial systems are linked, as in
colonial days, with those of the former colonial ruler” (Nkrumah 1965). Colonial economies
were “export-oriented, vertically integrated economies, based on the export of raw materials and
import of manufactured goods” (Shivji, 2006c). After independence, former colonial powers
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were able to continue exploiting Africa’s natural and human resources for their economic
benefit. European countries, whose economies were primarily export-based and agricultural,
were unable to compete on the global market. As Nkrumah argued: “so long as Africa remains
divided it will therefore be the wealthy consumer who will dictate the price of African cash
crops. Nevertheless, even if Africa could dictate the price of its cash crops this would not by
itself provide the balanced economy which is necessary for development. The answer must be
industrialisation” (Nkrumah 1965) Not only was industrialization necessary for African
economic development, but it necessitated African unity as the foundation to counteract the
powerful neo-colonial European forces that threatened African countries.
After the intentional underdevelopment of Africa, European countries continued to
extract wealth from newly independent and economically dependent African countries. As
Walter Rodney explains, “All of the countries named as ‘underdeveloped’ in the world are
exploited by others; and the underdevelopment with which the world is now preoccupied is a
product of capitalist, imperialist, and colonialist exploitation” (Rodney 2012). This capitalist
exploitation was the basis of imperialist involvement in Africa, which continued far after the
colonial period and into today. Many African countries were able to develop, albeit slowly and
unevenly across the continent. One factor for this slow development was the lack of
industrialization and a sustained dependence on agriculture. The result is that “African agrarian
livelihoods are defined by a range of unstable and largely unrewarding engagements with
broader market relations” (Harrison 2010). Most African economies are unable to compete with
market forces that are generally controlled by Europe and the United States, the latter of which
grew into a strong imperialist power following World War II. The ties between the former
metropole and colonies became more complex, as “it is possible that neo-colonial control may be
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exercised by a consortium of financial interests which are not specifically identifiable with any
particular state” (Nkrumah 1965). This consortium of interests intervenes in Africa and extracts
wealth from countries deemed “in need of Western help” and “undeveloped.”
European countries moved swiftly to establish military presences, as well as financial ties
and trade deals after African countries gained independence. Therefore, European powers were
not just involved economically, but politically as well. Radical nationalists were overthrown in
military coups, such as Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Ahmed Ben Balla of Algeria. Others
were assassinated, as was the case for Patrice Lumumba of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, and Pio Gama Pinto of Kenya. All of these missions
were either sponsored or supported by Western Imperialists (Shivji, 2006c). In other situations,
African leaders were used by European countries as puppets for their own agendas, such was the
case of Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire and Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal. This
system of exploitation is characterized by “the former colonial power in which economic,
financial and military instruments work for keeping in power well-disposed leaders and
maintaining favourable policies which procure economic and financial advantages.” (Taylor
2019). Former colonial powers were thus involved in every facet of society in these newly
independent African countries.
Françafrique and the Communauté́ Financière Africaine (CFA)
Compared to other European countries, France retained a particularly tight and
economically exploitative bond with its former colonies. During the colonial period, France
created the entity of Françafrique, which tied French colonies to the metropole economically,
politically, and culturally. France established the CFA zone, trade agreements, military defense
accords, and cultural agreements based on the cooperation of the francophonie (Bovcon, 10).
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Many scholars argue that the Françafrique, and particularly the CFA zone, is neo-colonialist in
theory and in practice. The CFA is made up of two different currencies, which belong to two
different economic communities: the Communauté Économique des États de l’Afrique Centrale
(CEEAC) and the Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine (UEMOA). Both of these
currencies are printed in French banks and were first tied to the French Franc and then to the
Euro. The goals of the CFA were twofold: to protect French economic interests for natural
resources and to monopolize African markets for French manufactured goods (Taylor 2019,
Bovcon 2009). As Taylor argues, the result is that the “CFA franc has helped entrench its
member countries’ dependent positions as relatively low-priced sources of raw materials”
(Taylor 2019). The French colonial and postcolonial presence in Western Africa, coupled with
the fragmentation of African national economies, “constitutes an irresistible pressure for the
maintenance of colonial structures and policies and colonial ‘development,’ and that these in turn
no less irresistibly produce foreign domination and underdevelopment” (Amin 2009). Thus, the
foreign domination imposed by the French benefits of and perpetuates the same systems of
dependence in Africa.
While many perceive the CFA as an economic entity, it exists as an element within the
whole Françafrique apparatus, which has much deeper cultural and political implications,
particularly with respect to International Relations. Maja Bovcon positions Françafrique “within
IR literature as meaning France’s ‘sphere of influence’ or its ‘pré carré’ (backyard), which
presupposes the hierarchical order of an otherwise anarchical international system” (Bovcon
2011). This approach to French-African relations within the Françafrique regime allows a
particular analysis of North-South relations. This system was constructed to disproportionately
benefit France while entire countries in Africa were kept poor. This phenomenon is illustrated by
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a study conducted by Ameth Saloum Ndiaye, which demonstrated that between 1970 and 2010,
10 out of 14 CFA countries recorded net economic outflow (Saloum Ndiaye, in Taylor 2019).
Therefore, the CFA produces capital flight and corruption, while simultaneously preventing
economic diversification and perpetuating commodity dependence with France (Taylor 2019).
While France controlled much of the political and economic decisions within
Françafrique, “the lesser state (South) is not a mere passive recipient of the imperialist North.
While the leaders of the lesser states are constrained in their actions, they are nevertheless
partially responsible for the perpetuation or undermining of the dependency relations” (Nkrumah
1965: 21). Bovcon reiterates this point by noting that individuals on both sides benefited from
the personal enrichment possibilities brought about by the Françafrique regime (Bovcon 2011).
Both also emphasize the role of African political leaders in perpetuating this regime. The
Françafrique regime received support from many African political elites, including Félix
Houphouët-Boigny, the first president of Cote d’Ivoire. Houphouët-Boigny was a staunch
supporter of France’s close ties with its former colonies and actually coined the term
Françafrique (Bovcon, 2009). The close ties established by France and upheld through the
continuation of the Françafrique continued the neo-colonial structure systems following
independence.
Neoliberalism and Africa
The effects of neo-colonialism did not fade as the global economy began to liberalize,
rather it morphed to fit Western, liberal values of free markets and democracy. David Harvey
describes neoliberalism as “a theory of political economic practices proposing that human wellbeing can best be advanced by the maximization of entrepreneurial freedoms within an
institutional framework characterized by private property rights, individual liberty,
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unencumbered markets, and free trade” (Harvey 2007). This institutional framework was
imposed by Western countries, particularly the United States and Great Britain, to reorder the
global power dynamics. These Western democracies are economically, politically, and culturally
different from African countries, whose political societies were perceived as markedly newer and
less developed. The globalization of markets posed a particular threat to economically fragile
African countries, where there was a high concentration of small and vulnerable economies
(Harrison 2010). Rather than generating wealth, neoliberalism has served a redistributive
purpose, by either channeling income and wealth from lower class to upper classes or from
vulnerable countries to richer ones (Harvey 2007). The effects of globalization and neoliberalism
on African economies has been detrimental, as Western countries impose liberal values on
countries that have yet to catch up. As James Furguson notes, “poverty is not a sui generis fact or
a consequence of global scarcity but only a symptom of powerlessness” (Ferguson 1990). Thus,
aid projects will not eradicate poverty because they only serve to reinforce the system that causes
poverty in the first place (Ferguson 1990). The neocolonial project protects Western interests
while keeping other countries reliant on Western power and aid.
Neoliberalism in Africa has perpetuated the paternalistic nature of relations between
Africa and Western liberal nations. The common rhetoric in Western popular culture tends to
represent Africa in terms of “absences, delinquencies or alienness,” which reinforces Africa’s
sense of marginality with respect to achieving global progress (Harrison 2010). Issa G. Shivji
argues that the African state is villainized in the neoliberal discourse as corrupt and incapable of
learning. Therefore, the West argues that African countries need globalised foreign advisors to
mentor, monitor, and oversee their economic and political activity (Shivji, 2006c). This
paternalistic attitude guides Western relations with African countries, not just those of the former
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colonizers, but other Western nations as well. This highlights Nkrumah’s warning that “neocolonial control may be exercised by a consortium of financial interests which are not
specifically identifiable with any particular State” (Nkrumah 1965). The forced liberalization of
Africa served to economically benefit powerful Western nations, as it both perpetuated and
expanded the neo-colonial system within Africa.
It is not only Western liberal nations that have pushed neoliberal values on Africa, but
also international organizations like the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). Harvey argues that advocates of the neoliberal mindset occupy positions
of influence in many domains, including education, the media, corporations, state institutions,
and international institutions such as the IMF and the WTO (Harvey, 2002). These institutions
play crucial roles in imposing neoliberalism on African countries, as shown by the effects of the
infamous World Bank report, Accelerated Development for Africa: An Agenda for Africa (World
Bank 1981). This report was followed by structural adjustment programs (SAP) that
concentrated on stabilization measures, such as eliminating budget deficits, decreasing inflation
rates, opening the markets and liberalizing trade (Shivji 2006c). Shivji contends that the World
Bank blamed the African state by claiming that “it was corrupt and dictatorial, it had no capacity
to manage the economy and allocate resources rationally, it was bloated with bureaucracy and
nepotism was its mode of operation” (Shivji 2006c). The World Bank’s prognosis of the
economic issues in Africa were not just economic, but political as well. Prescriptions were given
in terms of good governance, human rights, transparency, and democracy, thus moving SAPs
from the economic to political realm, and from policy to ideology (Shivji 2006b). The results of
the SAPs have proved to be devastating for many African countries, as they were forced to
sacrifice spending on social programs, such as education and healthcare (Shivji 2006b). Thus,
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the neoliberal Bretton Woods Institutions produced reforms that required African nations to fit
into Western liberal conceptions of good governance, economics, and policy that proved
ultimately detrimental to countries in Africa.
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, which marked a fundamental shift in the
international arena, Western imperialist powers were able to launch their ideological offensive.
The neoliberal package imposed on African countries was, and continues to be, an ideological
offensive rather than simply an economic program of reform (Shivji 2006c). The neoliberal
rhetoric has shifted following the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War from anticommunist and pro-democracy to one of human rights. According to Bernard Hours, the Western
liberal agenda wants a global recognition of fundamental human rights, which also works to
normalize Western values as the final project of globalization (Hours 2003). The emphasis on
human rights is not necessarily altruistic because “the political changes in the post-Cold War era
have worked to establish closer linkages between trade and human rights standards” (Koshy
1999). The Western imposition of neoliberal institutions in Africa have thwarted efforts to
develop and unite, thus hindering the establishment of a Pan-Africanist movement. Issa G. Shivji
describes African Nationalism as the antithesis of globalization, which is inherently imperialist
(Shivji, 2006b). Neoliberalism builds upon and solidifies the power structures imposed on
Africa, which were established under colonialism and continued to the neo-colonial period.
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) and Neo-colonialism
The role of NGOs within the context of globalization, free markets, and open trade
agreements is rather contested by the academic community. Bernard Hours explains that NGOs
have often been viewed as “non-objects” in the social sciences, much as other “third sector”
organizations like charitable, militant, or developmental groups (Hours 2003). Much of the NGO
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discourse also builds off of Francis Fukiyama’s ‘end of history’ theory, which argues that the
current capitalist system under the hegemony of the imperialist North is permanent (Igoe and
Kelsall 2005; Shivji 2006b). The ‘end of history’ theory pushes the liberal ideals of globalization
and free market capitalism as the final stage of history, thus refuting the possibility of any
Marxist or socialist advancement following the fall of the Soviet Union. NGOs emerged in the
1980s and 1990s as a response to failed development and aid projects, which were top-down
endeavors (Hearn 2007). These decades saw a proliferation of NGO formation, mainly in
response to neoliberal values of low government intervention and the changing global climate
after the end of the Cold War (Igoe and Kelsall 2005, Hearn 2007).
Proponents of NGOs argue that NGOs and an improvement of African civil society
would benefit African countries. NGOs were believed to be closer to society than governments,
and thus better equipped to address the humanitarian and social issues that the West wanted to
confront in Africa. (Clark 1991) Furthermore, NGOs are not restricted by politics in the same
ways that governments are, and they can act with greater “diversity, credibility, and creativity”
(Clark 1991). A critique of past development projects was that it was too top-down, centralized,
and hubristic (Igoe and Kelsall 2005). In the 1990s, the belief was that NGOs would become the
foundation of global civil society (Igoe and Kelsall 2005). However, NGOs do not act uniformly,
especially when compared by nation of origin. Stroup and Murdie noted the systematic
differences in actions and strategies taken by International NGOs (INGOs) from different
national environments. For example, French advocacy tends to be more confrontational due to
the “relative exclusion of French civil society groups from the political process” (Stroup and
Murdie 2012). The complicated fabric of NGOs, at both the international and the domestic
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levels, further increases possibilities for foreign domination. The humanitarian aid sector and
NGOs are not entirely homogeneous, and the impacts different organizations have varies greatly.
Marxist and Socialist Critiques of NGOs
Contrary to the liberal praise for NGOs in confronting issues of poverty, sanitation,
democracy, and other humanitarian issues in Africa, there is substantial research showing that
NGO actions are not always beneficial, and rather promote a Western neo-colonial agenda. NGO
activity tends to focus on issues of health, education, gender, democracy, and the environment,
which tend to be the common domains mandated by donor groups and backers (Hours 2003).
Many critiques of NGOs are either Marxist or socialist in nature, and thus these critiques are also
in opposition to Western liberal imperialism. Issa G. Shivji expresses that since NGOs were born
in conjunction with the ascension of neoliberalism, they participle in upholding and refurbishing
its image (Shivji 2006c). In other words, the ascension of NGOs in the global setting is not
merely a hegemonic project, but rather was based on the foundations of liberal theory (Hearn
2007). One Marxist interpretation of NGO activity asserts that Western concerns about welfare
merely serve to pick up the pieces following the socially destructive SAPs (Igoe and Kelsall
2005). Furthermore, efforts to democratize African political systems are associated with liberal
definitions of democracy for the middle classes (Igoe and Kelsall 2005). NGOs therefore push a
liberal agenda of ineffective aid and democratization, while African countries remain weak and
susceptible to market changes. NGOs often claim to be apolitical and ideologically neutral,
however their actions remain aligned with neoliberalism (Sakue-Collins 2020).
There are also concerns about the quality of service that NGOs provide for local
communities. NGOs that pursue humanitarian aid often promote Western liberal values, such as
democracy. Human rights activists tend to fight for the rights that they believe to be the most
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important, but these rights often conflict with what local populations feel would make the
greatest impact on the quality of their lives. For example, voting rights may be desirable from the
Western perspective, but for many people, this issue falls behind land tenure rights in levels of
importance (Barnett 2017). International NGOs promote a liberal agenda that often conflicts with
local views on what the community needs. Many international organizations become
paternalistic, which is “motivated by the desire to help--not just anyone, but those who are
deemed unable to act in their own best interests” (Barnett 2017). Experts critique the paternalism
present in international intervention, which includes the work of NGOs, particularly International
NGOs. The ostentatious paternalism that characterizes much NGO work--particularly that of
International NGOs-- is also present in neo-colonial rhetoric promotes aid and assistance through
a discourse that centers around the promotion of dignity based on the needs of beneficiaries
(Hours 2003). The paternalistic nature of Western involvement mirrors colonial and neocolonial
rhetoric that emphasizes the societal inferiority of the African continent compared to the
superiority of Western liberal values. Even efforts to restore power to localities often results in
Northern NGOs thwarting the work of Southern NGOs. Southern NGOs are also reliant on
foreign aid, which makes them dependent on external resources and patronage and reinforces
Northern development policies (Hearn 2007). Without acknowledging the detrimental effects of
Western liberal capitalism on African countries and the role that NGOs play in perpetuating this
narrative, there cannot be meaningful societal and economic progress in Africa.
A Critique of Humanitarianism and Human Rights
As shown in the previous section, the paternalistic nature of the imposition of Western
values on African societies is supported through NGO intervention. Many scholars raise
particular critiques on the humanitarian aspects of NGO intervention and the imposition of
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universal Western values and universal human rights. International human rights NGOs focus on
abuses abroad and seek “reform of governmental laws, policies, and processes to bring about
compliance with American and European conceptions of liberal democracy and equal
protection” (Mutua 2007). Thus, INGOs work to push a universal human rights agenda that
aligns with Western liberal values. Two organizations that have engaged in this narrow approach
to human rights are Human Right Watch and Amnesty International. Susan Koshy explains the
transition of neo-colonial strategies of power as shifting from the goals of the civilizing mission
during the colonial period of the nineteenth century to the American-sponsored anticommunist
and modernization rhetoric that followed. Another shift came after the fall of the Soviet Union,
and promoted “new universalist ethics of human rights, labor standards, environmental
standards, and intellectual property rights” (Koshy 1999). There has been an increase of human
rights NGOs on the global political stage, but their effectiveness has been uneven and sporadic
(Koshy 1999). This transition in neo-colonial rhetoric aligns with the increase in NGOs that
promote human rights, as well as neoliberal values.
Not only has the rhetoric surrounding human rights shifted, but so has the motivations
behind intervention. Jean Bricmont critiques the use of “universal values” to justify, and
sometimes require, international intervention on humanitarian grounds, which he terms
humanitarian imperialism. He highlights this Western desire to critique human rights violations
without critiquing the causes, conflicts, and wars that produce these violations. He notes a
proliferation of organizations, usually based in wealthy countries, that watch and denounce
human rights violations in poor countries (Bricmont 2006). Randall Williams echoes this, saying
that “In the 1970s human rights became an increasingly favored tool through which activists in
the global north sought to expose and mitigate a variety of extreme ‘abuses,’” particularly in
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formerly colonized countries (Williams 2010). Additionally, many human rights INGOs fail to
explain why abuses occur for fear of justifying them and revealing that some civil and political
rights violations stem from underdevelopment (Mutua 2001). Human rights INGOs developed
the “concepts of ‘capacity-building,’ ‘empowerment,’ and ‘civil society’ as they argued the need
for a long-term involvement in society and a sphere of the influence independent from the Third
World state” (Chandler 2001). Susan Koshy further explains that the “the institutionalization of
the role of NGOs within the UN reflects the very power differences that their activities try to
counter, since current arrangements favor the resource-rich Western-based NGOs” (Koshy
1999). Thus, human rights NGOs are unable to dictate their agenda as well as wholly critique the
neoliberal and western Imperialist structures that oftentimes are a source of human rights
violations in the first place.
Donor-NGO Relations
The relationships between donors and NGOs often dictates actions and agendas taken by
the organization, which limits independence. A large number of NGOs are donor funded, which
creates a particular relationship between donors and recipients. The cost of the development
services that NGOs provide cannot be met by their recipients, who come mainly from poorer and
less developed countries. Therefore, NGOs have to cover their costs by accessing surpluses
generated by the for-profit capitalist market economy—the same neoliberal economic system
that is creating deep inequalities between classes and countries (Fowler 1992). Many NGOs do
not have any independent sources of funding, and therefore have to seek donor funds through
procedures set by funding agencies, which could limit the scope of action an NGO could take
(Shivji 2006c). This system of funding NGOs creates an unequal partnership between donor and
recipient, as money becomes an expression of power (Reith 2010). The resource interdependence
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is characterized by NGOs' reliance on donors for money and donors’ reliance on NGOs for their
reputation in development work, but this relationship is often asymmetrical (Ebrahim 2003b).
Furthermore, because donors control funding, “it is often their goals that are pursued, with NGOs
having to adapt to them” (Reith 2010). If NGOs do not fit within the donors’ agenda, then
funding could be rejected. The asymmetrical relationship between donors and NGO recipients
has consequences for accountability measures, transparency, quality of services, and scope of
action.
The power imbalances between donors and NGOs are reinforced through an established
system of asymmetrical control and flow of money, but also in how NGOs pursue donor funding.
NGOs are increasingly dependent on donor funding, which often restricts the actions an
organization can take. Aid oftentimes comes with conditionalities, which is the fundamental tool
used by donors to control NGO activities, as NGOs often have little power to reject it (Reith
2010). NGO mission statements are often vague and amorphous, with a substantial number of
NGOs being set up to respond to what is perceived to be in vogue at the time (Shivji 2006c).
However, Reith also notes that it is predominantly the NGOs that ask donors for money to
sustain their operation (Reith 2010). International NGOs can be characterized as bureaucracies
that develop partnerships depending on a cost-benefit balance in an effort to further their own
material and ideological selfish interests (Egger 2017). It is also becoming increasingly common
for NGOs to be commissioned by donors, the state, or even the corporate sector, to do
consultancy work and to dispense funds or services (Shivji 2006c). The complicated relationship
between donors and NGOs may be mirrored if NGOs turn and place conditionality upon services
for recipients (Reith 2010). Reith does note that donors also experience pressure, as there are
demands to keep money flowing. However, donors have flexibility on where to allocate funds,
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whereas NGOs do not (Reith 2010). Donor-NGO relationships are complicated and create power
imbalances with roots in conditionality and competition
Another critique of NGOs calls for greater accountability and transparency in the NGO
sector (Burger and Seabe 2014). The public is becoming more discerning on the subject of NGO
accountability and are therefore looking for indicators of achievement, impact, and efficacy
(O’Dwyer and Unerman 2008). This shift towards heightened accountability and transparency
affects donors, NGOs, and recipients alike. Accountability exists in many forms and
characterizes the complex relationships between donors, NGOs, and beneficiaries. NGOs are
accountable in several ways: upward to donors, downward to beneficiaries, and internally to the
NGOs themselves (Ebrahim 2003a). Upward accountability, as explained above, is characterized
by donor funding and conditionalities imposed on NGOs. The mechanisms of upward
accountability are often in the form of annual project reports and financial records (Ebrahim
2003). Downward accountability, on the other hand, focuses on the relationship between NGOs
and their beneficiaries. The mechanisms of downward accountability, such as evaluations,
remain comparatively underdeveloped to upward accountability measures (Ebrahim 2003a).
Future research needs to explore more authentic and valuable forms of downward accountability
in order to improve the relationship between NGOs and beneficiaries (Burger and Seabe 2014).
Alnoor Ebrahim also differentiates between external and internal forms of accountability.
External accountability, such as laws and regulations, are inadequate mechanisms of
accountability because they represent government standards for behavior. On the other hand,
mission statements are an example of effective internal accountability, as they lay out the
principles and codes of conduct of NGOs (Ebrahim 2003b). However, “if accountability
mechanisms are merely used as control and justification instruments, rather than as tools for
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learning or for disseminating findings, then mission drift will become more likely as NGOs
become more distant from their beneficiaries” (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2008). It is therefore
necessary to be wary of accountability mechanisms that put the donor’s desires above the needs
of the project beneficiaries.
Donors exert a lot of power over NGOs, and they can use their influence to push their
own agendas and values. Many scholars argue that asymmetrical power relationships perpetuate
neo-colonial and imperialist values. For example, Yimovie Sakue-Collins argues that “the
uncritical subscription to western ideals and models through funding asymmetry enables nongovernmental organizations... to function as ideological foot soldiers in the broader project of
arrested development of Africa” (Sakue-Collins 2020). This highlights the fact that Western
powers remain entrenched in the underdevelopment and exploitation of resources in Africa,
which is a continuation of the colonial project. Issa G. Shivji critiques the power imbalance in
which NGOs rely on donors for sustainable funding and legitimacy and notes a circulation of
elites between the government and non-government sectors (Shivji 2006c). This highlights that
the relationship between donors, NGOs, and governments are complicated and have a significant
impact on organizations' actions. This critique of donor-NGO relationships is a critique of neocolonial influences in Africa and the neoliberal exploitation that occurs as a result.
French NGOs
The NGO sector in France differs from many other Western liberal countries, particularly
Anglophone countries, in that it receives little support from the centralized state. Contrary to
other European countries, the French nonprofit sector was secularized and restricted by the
centralized French state at the beginning of the 19th century (Archambault 2001). France is not a
very receptive political environment for civil society organizations, and there are reports of
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antagonism between French INGOs and the French government despite recent efforts to facilitate
collaboration (Stroup and Murdie 2012). The relationship began to change in the mid-1960s,
where there was a multiplication of organizations advocating for protection of the environment,
women’s rights, and international development in developing countries. France’s nonprofit
sector began to catch up to those in other Western countries in the 1960s and 1970s
(Archambault 2001). French NGOs have considerable resources, but they are far less than those
of major American, Canadian, and British NGOs, such as CARE, Greenpeace, World Wildlife
Fund, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and Oxfam (Cohen 2004). Even though
France is a comparatively resource-scare environment for private charities due to the lack of
funding provided by the French government, French NGOs benefit from a small but influential
group of private supporters (Stroup and Murdie 2012).
France’s NGO sector has developed behind those of Anglo-Saxon countries, but it
follows a similar trajectory in terms of professionalization and bureaucratization. The creation of
Médecins Sans Frontiers (MSF) in 1971 marked the beginning of a new generation of French
NGOs (Cumming 2005). In the era of globalization, “the French state has encouraged
developmental NGOs to undertake bureaucratic forms or professionalization” (Cumming 2008).
Johanna Siméant argues that NGOs often turn ‘global’ in order to expand their ability to access
human and financial resources, both public and private, and that this trend is partially driven by
the growing competition between NGOs (Siméant 2005). Due to the unequal nature of donor
funding and the particular nature of the French nonprofit sector, French NGOs actions are
aligned with resource dependence theory and must respond to the demands of their donors,
which is mainly from public donors and grassroot supporters (Cumming 2008). Large INGOs
have become very professionalized, like their American, Canadian, and British counterparts, but
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they are increasingly being perceived as bureaucratic and self-interested (Cohen 2004). The
French NGO sector differs from that of many other liberal countries, which is partially due to the
relative lack of support by the centralized French state. However, this does not stop French
NGOs from operating on the global scale.
Areas for Further Study
The distribution of research between different African countries is very uneven and often
focuses on Anglophone countries. Obie Porteous examines this unequal distribution by
reviewing all peer-reviewed economic articles on Africa. He finds that 45% of all economics
journal articles and 65% of articles from the top five economics journals focus on five countries
(Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, Uganda, Malawi). These five countries make up only 16% of
Africa’s population (Porteous 2020). Many articles are also content-specific, and thus the
conclusions cannot be applied within a broader context (Porteous 2020). Importantly, Porteous
finds that countries that have English as the official language is one of the factors that most
influences the propensity for research to be conducted there. The other reasons Porteous
identifies are higher rankings on the peacefulness index, the number of international tourists and
population. The uneven distribution of literature leaves many gaps in research, particularly for
countries that do not have English as an official language. Therefore, studying other regions of
the continent, like Francophone Africa, would lead to a fuller understanding of political and
societal phenomena that influence events in Africa. This gap of literature needs to be filled to
create generalizable and region-specific research.
While there is substantial literature that links NGO activity to perpetuating neo-colonial
influence and structures, there is not much literature of how French NGOs act within the neocolonial context. The French NGOs sector is not as large as those in Anglo-Saxon countries,
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particularly those of the United States, Great Britain, and Canada, which tend to dominate the
global NGO sector. However, understanding the role that French NGOs play in the global era
could serve to illuminate neo-colonial practices that continue to exist. The particularity of the
Françafrique apparatus within Africa and its relationship with NGOs is understudied and could
further reveal elements of this relationship. Furthermore, while there is much literature on
accountability mechanisms and the relationship between NGOs and donors, there is not much
research on how this works in different NGOs. Considering the particular nature of French NGO
funding in relationship with the French state, there is a lot of room for further research. Overall,
this honors project aims to elucidate the gaps in the literature regarding French NGOs and how
they act in Francophone West Africa.
IV. Hypotheses
Through this analysis of the literature around neo-colonialism and NGOs, a common
theme emerges about the creation of dependency structures as an element of NGO-supported
neo-colonial activity. Thus, this project will look into donor funding models as well as the size
and administration of NGOs as independent variables. These two factors will be used to analyze
whether French NGOs contribute to neo-colonial structures in Francophone West Africa. Thus,
this project will address the two following hypotheses:
H1: There is a positive correlation between donor funding and French NGO neo-colonial
activity.
H2: Bureaucratization of French NGOs leads to greater neo-colonial activity.
V. Methodology
My research for this project relies mainly upon interviews, as well as secondary data
sources on funding. Beginning in January 2021, I conducted virtual interviews with current
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humanitarian aid workers, local office administration, and field workers to better understand
NGOs outside the controlled images published by different organizations. My research focuses
on Francophone West Africa, which is comprised of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea,
Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Through the help of Professor Laura Seay and
Professor Mouhamedoul Niang, I made primary contacts and then used a snowball method to
find more contacts. The interviews followed a semi-structured format, with eight formal
questions to begin, but conversation was able to flow wherever necessary. The questions were
used to prompt the interview participants to speak about their experiences working in different
French NGOs, the internal structure of the organization, thoughts on local perception, and issues
related to funding practices.
I conducted eight interviews between February 1, 2021 March 10, 2021 with
humanitarian aid workers that worked at large French NGOs working in Francophone West
Africa. While I was unable to conduct field research due to the COVID-19 pandemic, I
conducted interviews over Zoom and Skype. The interviews ranged from thirty minutes to an
hour and were conducted in French and English. I spoke with participants in France, Senegal,
Switzerland, Kenya, and the United States. The participants represent a relatively diverse set of
experiences within the humanitarian aid sector, with some participants working only at the field
level and others working in administrative roles. Due to the limitations of being unable to
conduct field research, I could not access potential participants working at the local level in
many different countries in Francophone West Africa. However, the virtual format allowed me
access to workers at the international level. I have collected several perspectives from expatriate
staff as well as country level staff.
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In addition to interview data, I also compiled data from the European Commission’s
European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, also previously known as European
Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). The ECHO data shows all humanitarian aid
grants given by the European Commission. The data provided by ECHO captures donor,
implementing agency, recipient, value, crises or disaster, and the amount committed or
contracted. ECHO data goes back as far as 1994, but the designation of specific implementing
organizations began in 2011. For one dataset, I specified ECHO as the donor and for another, I
specified France. As explained later in this thesis, the complex nature of funding practices and
international NGO organization makes it difficult to measure where funding goes. Because of
this, I looked only at French branches of French NGOs, like MSF-France, MDM-France, and
Handicap International, to avoid capturing funding directed to different semi-autonomous
branches. I also omitted funding going to the French branches of INGOs that are not based in
France, like the French branch of the Red Cross. By choosing to look only at French branches of
France-based NGOs, I hope to better understand how these organizations operate within the
larger apparatus. A further study could go into the intricacies of the funding practices to see if
different branches of French NGOs, or French branches of other INGOs, work to uphold neocolonialism in the same way.
In evaluating the relationship between donor funding, bureaucratization, and neo-colonial
activity, the interview data and data collected from the European Commission's ECHO serve as
the primary sources of information for this project. In order to evaluate my data, I use a set of
observable implications to determine whether or not I am able to support my hypothesis. These
observable implications are observable factors that I would expect to see present if French NGOs
are perpetuating neo-colonial structures. The criteria are as follows:
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Donor Funding
1. I would expect to see a lack of technological development.
2. I would expect to see earmarked funding toward specific projects.
3. I would expect that INGOs receive the majority of funding from large donors.
4. I would expect to see NGOs exhibiting upward accountability to donors over
accountability to beneficiaries.
Bureaucratization
1. I expect NGOs to exhibit a lack of exit strategy
2. I expect there to be a disconnect between staff working in the field and staff working in
headquarters
3. I expect to find evidence of career humanitarian aid workers
Other Observable Implications
These observable implications did not fit in with my two hypotheses, but they are other
indicators used to measure the extent to which NGOs perpetuate neo-colonial structures.
1. I would expect that there is an imposition of Western values.
2. I would expect to see instances of insensitivity to the local culture.
3. I would expect that INGOs exhibit a lack of training provided for the local population.
4. I would inspect there to be a decrease in local funding for projects and development.
VI. Overview
Chapter 2 analyzes how different donor funding practices create dependency structures,
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limit NGO ability to act freely without outside influence, and lead to lack of technological
development. In this chapter, I argue that that donor funding creates dependency and stalls
development. NGOs are reliant on donors for funding, and beneficiaries are reliant on the funds
that the NGOs bring. Chapter 3 looks at the growth of INGOs and their administrative structure.
This section draws connections between the growth of INGOs, increased disconnectedness,
issues of decision making, and neo-colonialism. Chapter 4 addresses the human elements and
neo-colonial values that are upheld through this asymmetrical power structure that benefits
Western liberal interests.

Chapter 2: Donor-Funding
“The French Embassy Story”
Looking at the global humanitarian assistance industry, “it's really the largest unregulated
industry in the world.” Many humanitarian aid workers have stories about unusual interactions
with donors, administration, or the entire humanitarian aid apparatus. One such story is the
“French Embassy story” told by one experienced humanitarian aid worker. The story takes place
in the period following the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended fighting during the
Second Sudanese Civil War. The French Embassy approached a French NGO with 300,000
euros and the desire to do a project in the south of Sudan. Looking for a project to do, the NGO
settled on renovating an operating block at a hospital in the South that was in horrible condition
with holes in the roof and no air conditioning. People were moving back to the Malakal region
due to the cease in fighting, and there was also a major landmine problem. Therefore, the
operating block appeared to be a good project. The French NGO decided to renovate the

33

operating block, and the finished project looks amazing. They installed lights and air
conditioning, fixed the holes in the roof, and added new operating tables. However, while talking
to the head surgeon of the hospital toward the end of the project, the aid worker commended the
project saying, “Wow it's going to be really nice when it's finished.” The surgeon turned and
replied: “It wasn’t so bad before.”
This story serves to highlight the disconnect between Western humanitarian interests and
what would actually most benefit the local populations. The irony of the situation is that the
renovation of the operating block was a success, but the person who would use it the most did
not see the need for it. At the opening ceremony, the French Ambassador and the local governor
were in attendance. Pictures were taken, ribbons were cut, and people were happy with the
project. In the same hospital, however, there was a shortage of nurses and no recovery ward.
After surgery, there was no way to ensure the patients continued recovering or if they had
complications. In reflecting on the French NGO’s decision to renovate the operating block, the
participant wonders, could the money have been better spent by hiring more nurses? The answer
is not clear, but hiring nurses would certainly not have provided the same photo opportunity as
the renovation of the operating block. Additionally, the new operating block brought
construction jobs and improved facilities in the south of Sudan. However, it also benefited the
NGO and the donor, which was the French Embassy in this situation. The French NGO was able
to report its success back to the French Embassy to continue receiving funding in the future, and
the project also reflected well on the French Embassy and France by extension. Everyone wins,
but the Western interests stand to benefit more than others. One conclusion from this story is that
“the product, the actual product of the humanitarian assistance industry, is getting rid of donor
cash” (Interview on 2 February 2021).
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This story illustrates the complex and often contradictory nature of donor funding and the
ways that projects are conceived and executed. The majority of NGO funding comes from
international bilateral donors and contributes to dependency structures that reinforce the power
structures between the wealthier countries and the countries that are less-developed. French
NGOs, like other International NGOs, oftentimes rely on large bilateral donors for the majority
of their funding. With the exception of Médecins Sans Frontières, which relies primarily on
private funding and rejects state funding, French NGOs like Action Contre la Faim (ACF),
Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development (ACTED), Médecins du Monde (MDM),
Humanity & Inclusion (formerly Handicap International), and Solidarités International, all use
bilateral donor funding. This usually comes from the European Commission through ECHO or
from France itself through the Agence française de développement (AFD). This chapter
discusses the complexities of donor funding apparatus and the dependency structures that are
solidified. This chapter then looks at the incongruencies of this system and its implications for
the success of International NGO (INGO) work in Africa. The chapter closes in addressing how
these donor funding practices contribute to upholding neo-colonial practices
Donor Funding Apparatus
The funding for NGO projects primarily comes from large bilateral donors, which often
comes with a set of requirements that limits the action an NGO can take in a particular region.
As discussed in the Literature Review, the donor funding model works to create a power
imbalance that constrains how NGOs are able to use funds. NGOs are very reliant on funding for
the continuation of their operations, and therefore must continually seek donors to sustain the
project. In explaining the reliance of NGOs on donor funding, one subject described the
challenges of the relationship, stating:
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So, I guess I would say that the challenge was that you were quite reliant on only one or
two donors… quite a precarious situation to be in, and in the end, we were not able to
support the continuity of our operations … So, you know, I was very familiar with the
fact that you have to keep fundraising in order to stay afloat and do the work you need to
do. (Interview on 1 February 2021)
This particular NGO had to close its operation in Gabon because it was unable to maintain
funding. This quote highlights the importance of donor funding in the continuation of NGO
activity within a particular region, and a lack of funding could result in complete closure. NGOs
are incredibly reliant on donor funding, and thus the dependency cycle dictates possible lines of
action for many organizations. As Sally Reith explains, an “increase in donor control, combined
with the desire of NGOs to expand, means that NGOs increasingly depend on donors and are
consequently increasingly vulnerable to donor demands” (Reith 2010). Thus, there is a
dependency cycle that is created and perpetuated between donors and NGOs wanting to grow,
which renders NGOs even more susceptible to adhering to donor demands. An increase in donor
control limits the actions that NGOs are able to take and reinforce NGO dependency on donor
funding.
Most international NGOs rely primarily on bilateral funding to support their operations.
Examples of these large donors include the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), France’s AFD, the British Department for International Development (DFID), and the
European Commission’s ECHO. Other sizable donors are wealthy international nonprofits, like
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. According to the 2020 Global Humanitarian Assistance
Report published by Development Initiatives, the total valued amount of human assistance
totaled US$29.6 billion in 2019, which marked the first decline in the amount of assistance since
2012. The total value of humanitarian assistance totaled US$31.2 billion in 2018, US$29.1
billion in 2017, US$27.6 billion in 2016 and US$26.3 billion in 2015. In 2019, the five largest
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donors in terms of volume were the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom, European
Institutions, and Saudi Arabia (Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2020). Compared to
other global industries, the humanitarian aid sector is large and essentially unregulated.
Constraints on the Donor-Funding System
As discussed in the above section, the donor-funding apparatus is expansive, and it both
sustains the activities of NGOs while simultaneously limiting the actions that NGOs are
available to take. Within this apparatus, NGOs are often constrained by donors due to the
imposition of requirements or restrictions on use of funds. As illustrated in the “French Embassy
Story,” bilateral donors often approach NGOs with specific projects in mind. Therefore, the
decisions that NGOs are free to take are rather limited. Other times, NGOs must approach donors
in search of the funding necessary to continue operational activity. This system places major
constraints on NGOs, both international and local, to conform their actions that best suit donor
desires.
Large international NGOs are generally better suited to garnering attention and handling
the sizable amount of donations, so they tend to receive a lot more funding than local NGOs,
whose work is generally less well-known, more localized, and on a smaller scale with fewer
employees. However, many international NGOs tend to contract out to local NGOs in order to
implement projects. As one subject describes of the difference between local and international
NGOs:
They cannot get donor funding directly. Or they just don't have the administrative
systems in place. Because in order to manage a grant from like, the European
Commission or from USAID, you need an army of accountants… And it is a, it is just a
monumental pain… to do it… And it just takes a huge team… But the local NGOs very
rarely have that kind of administrative capacity. (Interview on 5 February 2021a)
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This quote highlights the differences between local and international NGOs in terms of
capabilities to handle funding, which is often the result of a lack of adequate staff to manage
large donations. However, this system also makes local NGOs reliant on INGOs for funds. Local
NGOs will enter into partnerships with INGOs and get disproportionate financial outcomes. As
the same subject described, “the international NGO, of course, will end up taking the lion's share
of the funding or an outsized share of the funding, even if the local NGO is doing the work.”
This imbalance is significant because local NGOs in Africa cannot accrue significant local
funding, and thus rely of foreign benefactors for the primary source of funding (Matua 2007).
This power imbalance benefits INGOs, for they can continue receiving the majority of foreign
funding while also implementing successful projects through the help of local NGOs. Rather
than being able to work independently, local NGOs must fit into this system that prioritizes
INGOs and Western interests above those of the local population. This asymmetrical framework
benefits international interests and keeps local NGOs reliant on the West, both through INGOs
and by contracting international donors.
The larger INGOs also have reputations that benefit them when looking for funding.
Because the humanitarian aid sector is so vast, there are many organizations that have more wellknown reputations than others. Such organizations are usually large international organizations
like the Red Cross, Oxfam, Care International, International Rescue Committee, and Human
Rights Watch. One subject described the donor mindset as:
We need to get rid of it, we need to do it in a way that looks good. We need to have
justification in case things get screwed up. So, we're gonna go with the name brand
organizations. We're going to go with the safer bets. Because in a way, it is hard to get rid
of a lot of this money. And sometimes it's a lot of money. And so, and it's kind of a
vicious cycle, because the government or just the general public want to give money. So,
you've got all this money coming in? And what do you do with it? You could spend it the
way you know best. But if that doesn't appeal to the donor, you won't get more money.
(Interview on 2 February 2021)
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The “vicious cycle,” as the subject calls it, emphasizes the importance of appearances in the
entire donor-funding apparatus. Donor money continues to flow to the “safer bets” because they
can produce the most consistent result, which in turn allows them to maintain funding for future
projects. Larger, name-brand organizations have the ability to garner more support from private
donors, governments, and the public. In order to succeed as an NGO, the organization must
appeal to the donor in order to secure funding. Thus, donor funding dictates, or at least strongly
influences, the actions that NGOs decide to take. This quote also highlights the fact that the
“safer bets” are often the organizations with the best reputation, that are the largest, or have
projects in multiple countries. The perceived increase in legitimacy of these organizations by the
donor community highlights the inequalities in perception of the developing world by the
Western world.
Within the so-called “safer bets,” there are still certain NGOs that have reputations for
greater success, professionalism, and responsibility. There are also differences between
international NGOs that receive funding, with Anglo-Saxon NGOs often being perceived as
more professional and thus more appealing to donors. In reflecting on their experience working
in a French NGO in Gabon, one subject recalled that:
The French NGOs are typically smaller… and do tend to have the reputation of being a
little less professional than the Anglo-Saxon NGOs. They also pay much less… You do
tend to get high turnover. And the fact that we had to close up shop, for me, you know in
hindsight showed a little bit of, I wouldn’t say amateurism, but I think definitely an
Anglo-Saxon NGO would’ve been more proactive in terms of the fundraising. (Interview
on 1 February 202)
This quote highlights some of the operational differences between Anglo-Saxon and French
NGOs. Even though this French NGO had a good reputation on the international sphere, it was
less proactive with fundraising and ultimately could not sustain its operations. This quote also
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touches on a key difference between French and Anglo-Saxon NGOs, particularly the fact that
French NGOs have higher turnover and are less career oriented than their Anglo-Saxon
counterparts. As shown in Table 1, French NGOs receive a relatively low proportion of funds
from ECHO. Lower funding and higher turnover rates separate French NGOs from more
professionalized international NGOs, which leads to reputations of amateurism within the
development field and has potential to impact funding. Larger French NGOs, like MSF, ACF,
and MDM, are more able to appeal to donors better than smaller and less reputable counterparts.
However, these French NGOs still work within the larger humanitarian aid system that
prioritizes INGOs over local Southern NGOs.
In response to some of these constraints within the donor funding apparatus, NGOs often
apply in consortium to receive funding. By applying with other organizations, the likelihood of
receiving a grant increases. As one participant explains, “more and more when you get grants,
NGOs have to apply in consortiums. So, like, they make an alliance of different NGOs… it's
better for the donor because they can put it all in one pot. And, you know, it improves the
chances because… everybody can sort of play their part” (Interview on 5 February 2021a). This
method can provide NGOs access more funding. However, there are many issues within the
system. The participant explained that applying in consortium had many flaws, stating that “it’s
[horrible] to manage, and they don't work very well. There's a lot of infighting, obviously.”
Increased competition to receive donor funding and infighting amongst NGOs is a result of the
limited access to access funding. Even though applying in consortium can help the odds that an
organization will get funding, donors are still likely to go with the well-known organizations,
even if they are not the best suited to a particular project. The participant remembered a situation
where his organization was selected to receive a grant, but another organization, Veterinarians
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Without Borders, would have been better suited to deal with this situation. Nevertheless, his
organization had better credentials and a better consortium, so the donor gave the money to them
instead of Veterinarians Without Borders. This situation highlights the difficulties inherent in the
donor funding model because even when NGOs apply in consortium to increase their chances,
they often fall short.
Accountability Measures and Securing Funding
As explained in the above section, NGOs have to appeal to donors in order to receive
funding to continue their operations. However, there are also specific reporting and
accountability measures to ensure that funds are getting spent effectively and efficiently. Popular
NGO accountability measures to donors include annual project reports and financial records.
NGOs are also accountable to the public, for local laws occasionally dictate accountability
measures employed by an organization. Finally, NGOs are accountable to their beneficiaries, but
as Alnoor Ebrahim’s research shows, these measures are comparatively underdeveloped and
underutilized (Ebrahim 2003a). Accountability measures serve to provide the public with
information on the actual product of NGO activity, but there is a limit to the information that
different measures capture. This section looks at accountability measures, their implementation,
and how NGOs employ them to attract more donor funding. Rather than being accountable to
beneficiaries, this study finds that NGOs put more emphasis on the accountability to their donors
and try to create a positive image in order to secure more funding.
The outward appearance portrayed by many NGOs can have multiple aims, which often
includes actively working to secure more funding. For instance, in looking at the origins of MSF,
it has changed from a surgical-based emergency-response NGO. David Chandler argues that
MSF, which was founded 1971 by French surgeons and journalists, symbolizes a “new
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humanitarian” cause that emphasizes “freedom of criticism” and the “right of intervention” in
responding to human rights crises (Chandler 2001). One subject spoke of other changes in the
MSF framework saying that “MSF now has very few surgical products. They’ve gotten into HIV
and Malaria and TB and all these other things. That's where the donor money is” (Interview on 2
February 2021). MSF has increased the scope of what they do as well as expanded globally into
70 countries, both of which appeal greatly to donors. Similarly, ACF is active in 50 countries,
CARE International is present in 104 countries, and Handicap International is in 55 countries.
The global presence of many of these NGOs highlights the magnitude of these organizations,
which also serves to reinforce donor funding by creating an appealing image. It “looks good” to
be active in 70 countries and to engage in activism. This shows the high level of importance
placed on making NGOs appeal to donors and the public.
NGOs use several methods to report back to donors and the public to stay accountable,
but these reports can also be used to depict the organization in a more positive light in an attempt
appeal to public and private donors. Annual reports are used to showcase what an NGO
accomplished over the year. These reports highlight the impressive statistics that are put forth by
the organization to highlight their medical accomplishments. In MSF’s 2019 International
Activity Report, for example, there are statistics on “Largest country programmes'' divided into
the categories “By expenditure,” “By number of field staff,” and “By number of outpatient
consultations” (ACF Financial Report 2019). The next page reports impressive medical statistics
on the number of malaria cases treated, people treated for cholera, and emergency room
admissions. These statistics, which represent the combined data from all MSF missions, paints a
pretty picture of the work that MSF accomplishes. However, many of these reports do not
capture the nuances behind the data. One participant worked with other humanitarian workers to
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collect and publish operational data, which they have started doing. NGOs publish selected data
to makes the organization look good and to increase donor pay back. The interview subject noted
that the NGO data reporting is based on “providing the best stories to keep the donors happy,
then provide some benefit to the beneficiaries” (Interview on 2 February 2021). While
beneficiaries do benefit from free medical assistance or other services provided by INGOs, the
emphasis of INGOs is first on satisfying their foreign benefactors. Therefore, the upward
accountability measures utilized by INGOs, like annual reports, do not paint the most accurate
picture of an organization’s work.
In other situations, the accountability measures that foreign benefactors put in place is
rather limited and can be ingenuine. The donors want to know how the money was spent, but
then they generally neglect the impact that a project or mission had on a particular local
population. One interview subject described the accountability process by explaining that:
The reporting was just mostly to satisfy the donor requirements for accounting... showing
where the money was spent. That was all of it…Occasionally the donor would ask for
impact studies… But the donor for the most part, and I suspect this is the case with most
humanitarian work, is it for the most part that was just kind of like box ticking. (Interview
on 5 February 2021a)
This “box ticking” characterizes the donor-NGO relationship with this particular French NGO,
and perhaps the humanitarian sector in general. It highlights the prioritization of funding than the
impact of particular projects on local communities. The organization is accountable to its donors
in order to secure more funding. However, donors also engage in upholding accountability
measures that do not touch at the true impact of particular projects. As Alnoor Ebrahim explains,
“the European Commission… is increasingly funding NGOs, often requiring highly detailed
quarterly and annual reports on ‘physical’ achievements resulting from funded projects (e.g.,
numbers of irrigation systems built, hectares of land afforested, and numbers of village
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organizations formed) as well as accounts of expenditures based on pre-specified line items”
(Ebrahim 2003a). The emphasis on physical achievements and data underscores the true impact
of some projects. This prioritization on donor funding aligns with the idea that the primary goal
of NGOs is “to collect as much money as possible” (Interview on 2 February 2021). The idea
that INGOs resemble businesses, or even multinational corporations in some cases, will be
addressed more in the following chapter. However, the lack of accountability towards the
beneficiaries highlights the fact that NGOs prioritize the accruement of funding rather than direct
benefit toward local populations.
There are anomalies to this donor funding model within the large INGO context. MSF
prides itself on rejecting large bilateral funding from state governments and instead relying
primarily on private donors, which it argues increases flexibility. This independence in terms of
funding allows MSF to report only to their private donors. One participant explains the benefits
of having this flexibility in stating:
When we were working [on] Ebola… the situation was evolving on a regular basis…
And we could decide with the same budget to close a center in a specific spot because
there were new cases in another spot, and we could do it quite quickly and move
resources and human resources and adapt. And we were working with an NGO in the
same area that got funding to build an Ebola treatment center in a specific spot, where by
the time they got there, there were no cases, but they could not say,“ok we will take the
money and we will go somewhere else,” because the funding was allocated to that
specific project. (Interview on 1 March 2021)
This quote illustrates how donor funding can constrain the actions that NGOs are able to take. In
this situation, the other NGO was unable to adapt to the progressing changes in the Ebola
outbreak, which is essential in emergency response work. MSF was able to adapt and evolve in
order to suit the local populations. In 2019, MSF-USA’s funding with donor restrictions
amounted to US$27,218,343 out of a total of US$222,971,038, which amounts to approximately
12.2% of funding. In 2018, the percentage of funds that were donor restricted was 11.3% (MSF
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Financial Statements 2019). While MSF-France is responsible for its own fundraising projects,
the MSF-USA provides insight into general funding attitudes within the organization. These
amounts, while low, are not insignificant. With fewer constraints posed by the international
donor community, MSF touts their flexibility and speed of response to conflicts.
While MSF is able to exercise this greater flexibility, they still work within a larger
humanitarian aid context that prioritizes Western interests and practices over local desires.
Furthermore, as Johanna Siméant explains, even NGOs that rely primarily on private funding
work hard to preserve their contacts. This cautiousness is due, in part, to the fact that private
fundraising is very vulnerable to shifts in public opinion (Siméant 2010). This fear might also
motivate the actions that NGOs take, and the methods they use to address different issues. As
Stroup and Murdie explain, “while French organizations are not as wealthy as their British
counterparts, both are largely funded by private donors and thus may need confrontation in order
to gain media attention and ultimately attract support from the general public” (Stroup and
Murdie 2012). Even though MSF claims independence from the system, the organization is still
constrained by the need to maintain a positive public opinion to receive donations.
Issues within the donor funding apparatus
The entire donor funding apparatus comes with a whole host of issues, from restrictions
on use of funds to problematic practices by NGOs and donors. This section explores the
problems present in the donor funding apparatus and how that affects the ability of NGOs to
address the needs of local communities. As the above section addressed, NGOs must work hard
to secure funding in order to keep their operations running. However, the section questions
whether NGOs and donors are always genuine in how they report numbers in their effort to
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attract and sustain funding. This section goes further into this issue, as well as the problems of
racism and feelings of Western superiority.
Generally, NGOs are more accountable to their donors than to the public that they serve,
which results in a lack of quality in some situations. Because most INGOs are active in so many
countries at once, the response to different situations is not always as specialized as necessary.
As one French NGO worker describes:
You're using outdated technology, outdated systems, bureaucracy. There are poor
incentive structures… there is no incentive to solve the problem, or by anyone's
standards. The national government doesn't really want you to, the donors don't really
want you to, the NGO certainly doesn't. You know… there's… poor knowledge of local
context. There's a lot of copy pasting… pretty much all humanitarian work is copy paste.
There is no incentive. There is no incentive to do it right. (Interview on 5 February
2021a)
This lack of incentive, which stems from a lack of accountability, highlights major flaws in the
humanitarian system. If the NGOs are primarily accountable upward to their donors, and the
donors do not really care if the problem gets solved, then there is really limited incentive to
address the root causes to solve the problem. Therefore, donors will keep giving money to
projects that will never address the root causes of a problem. In a way, the humanitarian system
is putting a Band-Aid over the issues of human rights and global inequality. NGOs often shy
away from addressing the root causes of human rights abuses, instability, and inequality. Many
NGOs do not work to eventually become obsolete from lack of necessity, and therefore, “many
INGOs fear that explaining why abuses occur may justify them or give them credence to the
claims of some governments that civil and political rights violations take place because of
underdevelopment” (Matua 2007).
The humanitarian aid system often uses outdated systems, bureaucracy, and outdated
technology, which further highlights disparities between the West and countries in Africa. The
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responses are not always specialized, and there is little knowledge of the local context. While
levels of success vary across organizations, projects, and countries, there is a general sense that
organizations cannot address the root causes of a problem. In cases of emergency response for
natural disasters and crises, this is not as much of an issue because NGOs enter to fill a gap and
then leave once the crisis is over. However, long term development projects have the potential to
exist for long periods of time without many significant measurable successes. One subject
describes his time working with a French NGO in Western Africa as a series of failures that
ultimately led to his decision to leave the NGO sector. He elaborated on these failures, saying:
So that there's no incentive to invest in that technical quality anymore. And that's getting
less and less and less and less… how do you increase turnaround for donors? Like how
do you get grants out quicker? How do you get reporting done faster? … How do you
have a slicker reporting machine? And how do you [get] a grant? How can you turn it
into a grant machine essentially? (Interview on 5 February 2021a)
The description of this particular participant’s experience mirrors concerns that other
humanitarian aid workers had with other organizations. The focus is on receiving donor funding
rather than delivering the best product to local populations. Due to their great reliance on donors
for sustaining operation, NGOs forgo technical investment and advancement in the quest to
accumulate more money. Ultimately, this highlights how the humanitarian aid sector has
morphed to resemble a large business with a marketing scheme rather than an organization that
works to alleviate poverty, disease, and inequalities.
Another issue related to the donor funding apparatus is when donor funding does not
come through, and NGOs must close up operations or give up a project. This section has
discussed humanitarian aid and donor funding mainly in terms of their particular relationship and
the accountability measures used. However, these organizations do provide the real product of
aid and services to local populations, whatever the level of quality it may be. For example,
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access to free medical care, clean drinking water, and food security all benefit local populations.
However, if donor funding falls short, the NGO cannot address the needs of local communities
and it has real consequences. Because humanitarian assistance provides great access to funding
and technology, local populations are oftentimes reliant on the organization because they are
unable to access these services elsewhere. One subject described the relationship with local
communities and civil society organizations (CSO) as positive, and that “they were just so eager
to have a chance to talk with someone and explain some of the work they’ve been doing”
(Interview on 1 February 2021). People were excited to have projects and resources to confront
the issues in their community. However, the funding took much longer than expected and
ultimately never ended up coming through. The local population’s initial excitement around the
possibility of funding for a project resulted in disappointment when the funding fell through.
This shows that while the scramble for funding creates asymmetric relationships between donors
and NGOs, there are also people who lose out when funding is not.
A major issue within the humanitarian aid system is the use of aid to push Western liberal
agendas and viewpoints on poorer countries. INGOs work within this framework to provide
necessary services that benefit local populations, but they also subscribe to the Western traditions
from where they are based. One subject spoke about donor practices and reasons why ECHO,
France, the United States, and other governments invest in humanitarian aid in the Sahel. He
describes the racism and geopolitical strategy involved in donor practices, saying:
It was pretty clear why certain donors were doing this. I mean, European Commission
invests in the Sahel because A, they're worried about terrorism, and B, they want to
prevent migration. And they're pretty naked about it… you get a lot, you get a lot better
chance of getting funding… if you mentioned something about migration in [the grant
request], okay. You know, and it's totally disingenuous because everyone in the business
knows that nothing we're doing is halting migration. And most of us don't even think you
should halt migration. Most of us think that there should be more migration to Europe,
you know, so, but we still put it in because we know that … the racist dudes over at
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ECHO the racist dude that's going to read it, you know, is going to be worried about, you
know, a mosque opening up next to his house, God forbid. (Interview on 5 February
2021a)
This quote clearly highlights the racism at play in ECHO, for they invest in the Sahel even
though humanitarian aid organizations will clearly will not halt migration and stop terrorism. The
reasons that Europe invests in the Sahel are very blatant, as the subject describes, and many grant
request writers know that including mentions to migration will better chances to receive funding.
Investing in programs that will not address the root causes of migration and terrorism is another
way that Western governments push their values upon developed countries. As Cumming
explains, “Where humanitarian aid started out as an expression of empathy with common
humanity, it has been transformed through the discourse of human rights into a level for strategic
aims drawn up and acted upon by external agencies” (Cumming 2001). The great flow of aid
coming from the West can also create dependency networks, where NGOs and thus beneficiaries
are reliant on Western funding.
There are major issues within the donor funding apparatus that are racist, disingenuous,
and keep countries in Africa reliant on foreign aid. There is little incentive pushing NGOs to
improve technology and structures, for the current system grants them funding without asking
about impact. By focusing on donors more than people, the needs of local populations take a
backseat position. NGOs emphasize their “people-based” approaches to development that are
grounded in the ideas of “capacity-building,” “empowerment,” and “civil society,” which
justifies “the need for a long-term involvement in society and a sphere of influence independent
from the Third World state” (Chandler 2001). The long-term involvement in African countries
are based on Western liberal values of empowerment, democracy, and civil society. However,
this section has shown the pitfalls and hypocrisies of this system, where NGOs tout humanitarian
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rhetoric and then use racist appeals to gain funding. NGOs perpetuate a system of Western
domination over African countries through the flows of humanitarian aid.
Funding Data
Data collected from the European Commission’s ECHO helps to showcase some of these
trends and traces the flow of money from the European Union and France to Francophone West
Africa. Table 1 represents grants given to West Africa by ECHO, while Table 2 looks at French
funding towards the region. As Table 1 shows, there is a significant flow of money into West
Africa. Francophone West African countries have benefited from large proportions of donor
money given to West Africa. The portion of total Euros given to Francophone countries in West
Africa ranges from 42.28% to 80.73% of total donations made. When looking at total euros
going to French NGOs in Francophone West Africa, the amount varies significantly from year to
year. In 2016, French NGOs did not receive any grants from ECHO, but in 2013, French NGOs
received over 24 million Euros in funding. Thus, the percentage of funding ranges, with the high
end being 19.83%. The proportion of total expenditures shows that French NGOs play a role in
directing money from Western donors into Francophone West Africa. As a donor, ECHO has
sent over 1.2 billion Euros to Francophone West Africa since 2011. It has donated over 130
million to French NGOs working in Francophone West Africa. This data highlights the
significant ties that exist between Europe and Africa.
While NGO funding rarely comes from one source and instead relies on large
international donors, like USAID and ECHO, governments still do play a role. Table 2 highlights
similar findings to those outlined in Table 1. With France as the donor, the monetary amount of
funding is significantly lower than ECHO grants to West Africa. Since 2005, the percentage of
funding from France to Francophone countries in West Africa ranges significantly, with the
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lowest percentage being 20.5% in 2007. However, in all years besides 2007 and 2017, the
percentage of funding falls above 45%. At the high end, funding reached 93.5% in 2014. As with
the percentage of funding to Francophone West Africa, the percentage to French NGOs in the
region varies significantly. In some years, the percentage is very low, especially between 2005
and 2008. In other years, the percentage is much higher, and it reached 42.5% in 2013. One
explanation for this higher percentage is because one grant went to multiple organizations. For
example, in 2013 a 1.5-million-euro grant was awarded to “PAM/Solidarités International.” As
explained earlier in the chapter, applying in consortium increases chances that NGOs get
funding. Additionally, while the total value of grants from France is relatively low, this could be
explained by French attitudes toward the nonprofit sector, for “France offers the least receptive
political environment for civil society organizations” (Stroup and Murdie 2012). France is
known for lower levels of government funding for nonprofit work, as Stroup and Murdie explain
“The share of official development assistance channeled through NGOs is less than one percent
in France and about four percent in Britain, while the US government may channel as much of a
third of its development assistance through NGOs” (Stroup and Murdie 2012) This could explain
the variation in percentages for French funding to French NGOs. Nevertheless, France gives a
significant amount of funding to French NGOs, which helps to support the hypothesis in
conjunction with the interview data.
Besides highlighting the large cash flows, these datasets provide short descriptions of
projects that the grant is going to help. These descriptions, labeled “crisis/disaster” in the dataset,
show some traditional funding language as well as the earmarked funding that is discussed
earlier in this chapter. In the ECHO dataset, examples of reasons for aid were: “Allocation de
subsistance pour les populations les plus vulnérables,” “réponse d'urgence auprès des
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populations affectées par le conflit au nord du Mali,” and “project Pédiatrique Médiconutritionnel adressé aux enfants de moins de 5 ans.”1 It is possible to trace political changes, as
well as epidemics and natural disasters. For example, in 2012 significantly more entries
addressed the crisis in Mali, citing: “Réponse en Eau, Hygiène et Assainissement à la crise
suscitée par l'afflux massif de réfugiés maliens en Mauritanie” and “Amélioration et sécurisation
des conditions de vie pour les réfugiés maliens en Mauritanie et les populations hôtes.”2 In the
France dataset, similar themes are shown. For example, there are grant entries reading “Crise
alimentaire au Niger,” or “Crise au Sahel.”3 The entries in this dataset are oftentimes less
detailed and more generalized. Another unique element about the France dataset is that France
gives a lot of funding to local governments and to French embassies, which is showcased in
Table 2. In 2020, one grant of 298,991 euros was given to the “Commune de Chambéry France” for the stated purposes of the “Crise au Sahel.” Chambéry is located in the AuvergneRhône-Alpes region of Southeastern France. While the dataset does not elaborate why Chambéry
is receiving aid for projects in Burkina Faso, it highlights the particularly close ties that France
still holds with its former colonies. Thus, the language as well as the numbers in the data show a
significant flow of funding towards Africa through designated projects.

“Allocation of subsistence for the most vulnerable populations,” “emergency response for nearby populations
affected by the conflict in Northern Mali,” and “Pediatric medical-nutritional project for children under 5 years.”
(translated by author)
2
“Response in water, hygiene, and sanitation to the crisis created by the massive influx of Malian refugees in
Mauritania” and “Improvement and securing life conditions for Malian refugees in Mauritania and the host
population.” (translated by author)
3
“Food crisis in Niger” or “Crisis in the Sahel.” (translated by author)
1
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Table 1. ECHO Funding to West Africa between 2011-2020
Total Euros to
Portion of
Portion of
Total Euros to French NGOs Total Euros
Total to
Year
Total Euros
Francophone
in
to
Francophone
West African
Francophone Francophone
NGOs
Countries
West African
Countries
Countries
2011 123,686,422.75
57,350,751.84
10,417,335.00
46.37%
19.83%
2012

240,538,836.31

175,057,899.68

20,197,409.00

72.78%

11.54%

2013

219,146,455.24

176,909,825.27

24,031,131.79

80.73%

13.58%

2014

235,053,239.81

153,319,009.69

19,248,000.00

65.23%

12.55%

2015

249,150,807.75

152,750,557.36

12,824,500.00

61.31%

8.40%

2016

259,486,557.75

147,200,664.35

0

56.73%

0%

2017

222,510,129.00

94,077,129.00

7,455,000.00

42.28%

7.92%

2018

275,858,426.20

122,264,031.84

7,100,000.00

44.32%

5.81%

2019

197,906,636.10

120,499,766.10

21,201,000.00

60.89%

17.59%

2020

169,927,183.00

89,627,183.00

8,380,560.00

52.74%

9.35%
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Table 2. France Funding to West Africa between 2005-2020

Year

Total Euros

2005

209,500.00

11,645,299.00

5,500,000.00

0.00

Total Euros to
French NGOs
in
Francophone
West African
Countries
326,326.00

2006

13,719,765.00

8,419,931.00

4,320,000.00

0.00

199,931.00

2007

7,874,564.00

1,613,800.00

0.00

163,800.00

0.00

2008

10,078,662.00

4,713,711.00

4,000,000.00

0.00

63,711.00

2009

3,341,600.00

1,641,600.00

1,000,000.00

0.00

550,000.00

2010

11,742,340.00

8,067,340.00

2,100,000.00*

0.00*

350,528.00

2011

13,593,141.00

9,163,925.00

0.00

0.00

643,925.00

2012

21,595,124.00

17,495,124.00

1,031,123.00

0.00

1,420,573.00**

2013

16,097,671.00

13,463,671.00

250,000.00

0.00

5,721,185.00**

2014

27,925,000.00

26,100,000.00

14,150,000.00

0.00

5,700,000.00

2015

15,007,719.80

9,700,000.00

0.00

0.00

500,000.00

2016

13,791,324.04

7,200,000.00

0.00

0.00

1,650,000.00**

2017

18,480,163.00

8,292,163.00

0.00

0.00

3,099,834.00**

2018

21,501,807.00

14,036,807.00

0.00

0.00

4,500,000.00**

2019

16,595,536.00

10,314,325.00

320,000.00

719,325.00

2,775,000.00

2020

25,546,873.00

18,552,718.00

0.00

344,648.00

4,573,727.00

Total Euros to
Francophone
West African
Countries

Total Euros to
Local
Governments

Total Euro
to French
Embassies

* Money to both local government and French Embassy
** Some grants were received in consortium with other INGOs
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Conclusion
This chapter outlines the problems of donor funding and how it creates dependency
structures that enforces Western liberal power over African nations. In looking at humanitarian
assistance as an industry, it is large and unregulated. As the “French Embassy Story” illustrates,
the product of humanitarian assistance is to get rid of donor cash in a way that appeals to donors.
In choosing projects that look good, donors are incentivized to give more funding, and the cycle
continues. The flows of money from the West into INGOs, which are generally based in Europe
and the United States, also create dependency on international organizations and stall
development in Africa.
Regarding the observable implications outlined to assess the hypothesis that there is a
positive correlation between donor funding and French NGO neo-colonial activity, the findings
in this chapter support all of them. In looking at lack of technological development, there was
evidence that different NGOs were not incentivized to develop and implement new technologies
as long as they were able to receive donor funding. Interviews and ECHO data also supported the
observable implication of expecting to see earmarked funding toward specific projects,
particularly with donors applying conditionalities and directing funds for certain projects. This
chapter also found that INGOs receive a majority of funding from large funding sources like
USAID, ECHO, and AFD. Excluding MSF, which relies on private donors, all organizations
depend on large bilateral sources of funding and are vulnerable to donor desires. However, even
organizations that rely on private donors are still susceptible to changes in public opinion.
Finally, NGOs exhibit a propensity for upward accountability to donors through the use of
annual reports and other reporting mechanisms. Meanwhile, impact reports and accountability
measures to study downward accountability are underdeveloped and underused by NGOs and are
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described as “box ticking.” All of these observable implications uphold the hypothesis that donor
funding leads to an increase in neo-colonial structure systems, as dependency is established
through cash flows, lack of technological development, and accountability to donors rather than
toward the populations that NGOs claim to help.
While INGOs rhetoric promotes human-based approaches to development that are based
on human rights and empowerment, the reality is much more complicated. This chapter shows
that while local communities benefit from humanitarian assistance, the dependency structures in
place preclude from the possibility of substantial systemic change. Instead of attributing human
rights violations, violence, and inequality to the global liberal economy, many organizations and
governments have the opinion that Third World countries could not be trusted with their own
development (Cumming 2001). The belief in Western superiority has informed Western
involvement in Africa, but it also aligns with the values of the humanitarian assistance industry
that claims to work outside the constraints of governments.
The following chapter will discuss how the internationalization of French NGOs has
contributed to neocolonial activity in West Africa. As touched on in this chapter, many INGOs
resemble multinational corporations. Donor funding apparatus and the size of INGOs fits into the
larger humanitarian assistance industry that benefits Western liberal interests.

Chapter 3: NGO Size and Administration
The Unnecessary X-Ray
The size of INGOs within the humanitarian aid apparatus have grown to resemble large
businesses and multinational corporations rather than acting like grassroots organizations that
operate at the local level. The complex administrative structures characteristic of INGOs can
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create competition and confusion both between NGOs and between branches of the same
organization. One interview participant, an American surgeon, told a story about his time
working in North Kivu in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, which is a region that has
experienced extreme violence and conflict during the past decades. He explained how the
organization wanted to keep a presence in North Kivu, which resulted in multiple branches of the
organization having and running missions in the same region. There were different missions run
by France, Belgium, and the Netherlands. The surgeon was working at the Belgian project, but it
was the French branch that had a project with X-rays and orthopedic surgeons.
The surgeon had a case of a man who had a femur fracture that did not heal correctly and
needed to be fixed. He tried to transfer the patient to the French mission, but they would not take
him. The surgeon felt confident that an X-ray was not necessary to do the operation effectively,
but the other expatriate staff insisted on getting an X-ray. The patient was sent six hours away to
Goma to get the X-ray, which was uncomfortable for him. The surgeon explained that the patient
came back a week later with a “horrible X-ray that didn’t show anything different than I could
have predicted” (Interview on 2 February 2021). The surgeon was able to appease everyone
involved, but in doing so, the patient had to jump through administrative hoops to receive an
operation that could have been performed without an X-ray. Could the patient have received
better care with less hassle? While there are always communication problems within large
organizations, this story shows how a lack of organization at the mission and country level can
result in suboptimal treatment for patients. More than anything, this story exemplifies the pitfalls
of large multinational organizations with many administrative barriers.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the donor funding model for NGOs reinforces
elements of neocolonialism by perpetuating dependency structures through flows of aid and
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western values. However, this donor funding model can continue, in part, because the INGO
sector is extensive, and that NGOs often resemble multinational corporations (MNC). This
chapter will discuss how the administration and size of INGOs contributes to dependency
structures and creates disconnects between humanitarian aid workers on the ground and the
administration in the headquarters.
INGOs or Multinational Corporations?
Large international NGOs resemble multinational corporations in the way that they
operate, receive funding, and are administered. Many subjects commented on the complicated
organizational structure of INGOs, with multiple administrative centers and country branches
under the name of one international organization. For example, MSF has five operational centers
located in Paris, Barcelona, Brussels, Geneva and Amsterdam. These operational centers are able
to work independently but are all members of Médecins Sans Frontières International. There are
also 24 MSF Associations, like MSF-UK and MSF-UAE, which report to one of the five
operational centers. This structure is complex, but it also resembles the structures of most
INGOs, both French and otherwise. For example, one subject described the organization of ACF
in comparison to MSF as:
You have ACF-UK, ACF-Spain, ACF-US, ACF-France, and they all have missions
except for ACF-UK. They all had missions that reported to their headquarters, but there
was a central Action contre la faim that was responsible for… network wide policies... So
individually, each headquarters had run its own show, but the main headquarters was
responsible for it… Most NGOs in Europe follow a similar thing. MSF has a similar one.
I guess the main difference is that Action contre la faim… one country had one mission,
so… one headquarters in one country and a mission, whereas… in one country, [you]
could have MSF-Holland, MSF-UK, MSF-France, and not always working with each
other. (Interview on 5 February 2021a)
This quote reveals the complex organization of INGOs, especially with respect to having
different headquarters and missions. Different wings of MSF operate within the same country
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with little to no communication. This highlights the expansiveness of the entire humanitarian aid
complex and the size of different INGOs. While there is some slight variation in the structure of
different organizations, like between ACF and MSF, there is still a general organizational
framework that resembles a large company or multinational corporation. All organizations have
a headquarters that dictates organization-wide agendas and activities, especially with respect to
mission statements. Today’s INGOs have morphed from NGOs into large multinational
organizations with larger capacities, budgets, and purview.
Below the administration at different headquarters, there are usually other staff who work
regionally, at the country level, and at the mission level. The number of people in these roles
depends on the size and wealth of the organization. One subject describes the international and
country level organization of MSF as:
MSF has a very complicated structure at the international level. At the field level, usually
we have a coordination in the capital that manages different projects--one or more
depending on the country. And sometimes you can even have different MSF sections
within the same country. So that's where it gets a bit more complicated. So, there is some
coordination to do between MSF sections and then among the different projects. And
then on the field you have the mission that is basically coordinated at the capital level and
then different projects with the coordinator and the medical coordinator that are actually
running the activities. (Interview on 1 March 2021)
The organization of the NGO has many levels and many people must report to others in different
roles. Many levels of coordination must function for an organization to work properly, but
INGOs have different levels of financial and administrative capabilities. For example, another
French NGO only had “one regional director covering all of Africa, more or less.” Having only
one regional director is problematic when the region in question is actually an entire continent
with 54 countries that have different cultures, languages, and histories. To have one director for
the entire region of Africa neglects the diversity of the people on the continent. Additionally, it
could lead to a ‘copy-paste’ situation where similar responses are used by NGOs in situations or
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countries where the culture and political climate is much different. The NGO sector is not only
large and overreached, but it also tends to generalize in ways that make responses more difficult
and less effective.
INGO structure also allows the different branches of the organization to act somewhat
independently from each other. While the heightened freedom can be beneficial in some places,
it could lead to convoluted responses in some cases or over-involvement in others. In describing
an experience while working at a French NGO in South Sudan, one subject described the
overwhelming presence of humanitarian aid workers. The workers were from all different
organizations and took a UNICEF plane to Aweil in South Sudan. Upon arrival in Aweil, he
describes over fifteen Toyota Land Cruisers from every NGO imaginable to take the
humanitarian workers to their respective missions. He described South Sudan as “NGO rich”
because there were different missions all over the country and in different sectors. He
emphasized that there was a “sometimes overwhelming NGO presence” (Interview on 10
February 2021). This experience highlights the nature of the NGO sector, wherein organizations
and donors flock to areas with greater levels of need. However, this conversely means that some
countries or regions receive disproportionate amounts of aid in comparison to others. Oftentimes
in conjunction with the demands of donor funding, NGOs swarm to places experiencing a crisis
that the international community deems acceptable for intervention while leaving other countries
unable to access aid.
None of this is to say that countries in crises do not deserve help and funds from the
international community. When there are crises, global support funnels aid into these countries,
often through NGOs. One local French NGO worker explains this by saying: “Ce que je vois
souvent, il y a plus de financement d'aller à un conflit... Quand tu prends le cas du Sénégal, le
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Sénégal est moins financé que le Mali parce que le Sénégal est plus stable” (Interview on 16
March 2021).4 This quote highlights the natural discrepancies in aid, with Senegal receiving less
aid than Mali because Senegal is more stable. As René Lemarchand explains, “Human and
environmental disasters attract NGOs like filings in a magnetic field, and the latter in turn
drastically reshape the contours of the social landscape” (Lemarchand 2013). There is more
financing to go into areas affected by conflict, or other crises like epidemics and natural
disasters. The participant also touches on the fact NGOs exist as long as funding is available.
These organizations can be there for several years, continually accessing donor funding and
providing services to local populations. In this sense, NGOs' actions mirror those of businesses
that continue involvement as long as it is lucrative. Local populations do benefit from the
services that NGOs provide, and organizations arguably provide the best services when able to
access sufficient amounts of funding. However, the overall structure of NGOs in the
humanitarian aid sector resembles a large multinational corporation rather than smaller and local
organizations working primarily at the local level.
The bureaucratic nature of INGOs is not unique to French NGOs, and it spans the entire
humanitarian aid framework, especially within large multinational organizations. As discussed in
the previous chapter, donor funding is the main way that NGOs are able to continue to operate,
and they often dictate the actions that an organization can take. One humanitarian worker with a
British NGO described the relationship between the US office, which was an affiliate and
oversaw operations, and the office in Senegal. He explains that even when the strategy was
developed in the Senegal office, it had to be approved by the U.S. office. Between these two,
there is also a regional structure for the entirety of West Africa that approves projects before

“What I often see is that there is more funding going to a conflict… When you take the case of Senegal, Senegal is
less funded than Mali because Senegal is more stable.” (translated by author)
4
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sending them to the American office for approval. The Senegal office also serves as the go
between for their local partnerships and the U.S. office. While the Senegal office is doing the
work, partnering on the ground, and formulating strategies, the U.S. office has the final say. This
not only shows the bureaucratic nature of INGOs, but it also highlights the imbalances between
Western offices and their interests in comparison to local authority.
French NGOs have followed the professionalization and internationalization of many
Anglo-Saxon NGOs, and they have increasingly become more multinational and bureaucratic.
For example, at its inception in 1971, MSF had 300 volunteers. However, MSF leadership
disagreed over whether the organization should stay at its current size or expand. Claude
Malhuret, who was the MSF president from 1977-1978, explained that “there was a very real
opposition between people who didn’t want things to become structured—who wanted to stay a
small commando unit of emergency doctors—and others who wanted to get organized.”
(Founding n.d.) The members who opposed the expansion went on to form Médecins du Monde,
while MSF followed the path of organization in order to provide better care, more support, and
better resources. On the MSF website, the organization touts its professionalism and the move to
become more organized. MSF now has offices in 28 countries and employs over 30,000 people.
At its inception, MSF aimed to provide medical care for people, but it has expanded to include
advocacy and technical training.
Urgenciers, Development, or Both?
In looking at the public image of NGOs, there is a tendency for NGO staff to regard the
work of their particular organization as outside the realm of critique. For example, MSF accepts
little funding from governments and considers itself a medical urgencier, or emergency-response
organization. As one subject explained, “my organization specifically works mostly in

62

emergencies, so we are a bit at the side of this discussion [on development] … Our funding
[doesn’t] go for development... we usually respond on a relatively short term to a specific
medical need... to simplify a little bit...the difference between emergency response and
humanitarian crisis and development” (Interview on 1 March 2021). While there are
organizations that focus mainly on development, MSF and other urgenciers also participate in
developmental policies. As Pascal Dauvin and Johanna Siméant explain in their book, Le travail
hummanitaire:
Tout d’abord, les missions des humanitaires, même ceux dont l’image publique est la
plus orientée vers l’urgence (Médecins du monde, Médecins sans frontières…), ne sont
pas toutes de court terme ou correspondant à des “crises” (guerres, catastrophes
naturelles, famines…). Elles révèlent la porosité qui existe souvent entre l’urgence et le
développement, entre le long et le court terme. (Dauvin and Siméant, 2002)5
The authors point to situations where MSF has engaged in long term projects and development,
like intervention in the prisons of Abidjan and missions for children living in the street in
Madagascar. Therefore, even though some NGOs hold a reputation for not engaging heavily in
development, that is not always the case.
While INGOs often portray pictures of white saviors responding to crises in faraway
countries, a majority or more of the NGO missions do not correspond with natural disasters,
famines, or wars. Therefore,
Malgré leur image publique, l’essentiel des missions des ONG médicales ne se déroule
pas en urgence : en 1998, sur les trois quarts des missions de MDM se déroulant à
l’étranger, 20% sont qualifiées de missions d’urgence. Chez MSF France, on peut
s’accorder à considérer que 75% des missions ne sont pas des missions d’urgence pure.
(Dauvin and Siméant, 2002)6
“First, humanitarian missions, even those with a public image most oriented towards emergency response
(Médecins du monde, Médecins sans frontières…), are not all for the short term or correspond to “crises” (wars,
natural disasters, famines…). They reveal the porosity that often exists in emergency response and development,
between the long and short term.” (translated by author)
6
“Despite their public image, many medical NGO missions do not take place in crises: in 1998, of three quarters of
MDM missions took place internationally, 20% qualify as emergency response. With MSF, one can consider that
75% of missions are not purely emergency response.” (translated by author)
5
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These findings show how INGOs, even those claiming to be urgenciers, are more involved in
development than they display to the public. With 20% of missions abroad considered
emergency response for MDM and 75% of all MSF missions considered not pure emergency
response, the public image and the actions of NGOs are at odds. Even though development and
training of local populations has the potential to improve living standards, the effectiveness of
developments made rests on the continued influx of funding.
Operations and Exit Strategies
The operation and structure of INGOs promote numerical measures of success to
accomplish as much as possible, which oftentimes fails to address the root causes of the
problems. One humanitarian aid worker spoke of his experiences with two different French
NGOs as:
MDM kind of formed out of MSF. They felt that there should be greater emphasis on the
human rights component, and training and working with the locals. So, I actually liked
the MDM projects better because it was more of a training component. Emphasis was not
for us to go in and do as many cases as possible. But to work with a local guy and see
what their needs were, support them and help them. (Interview on 2 February 2021)
Even though there are differences between this subject’s experience with the two organizations,
the participant still spoke of the problems with NGO action and a “go in and do as many cases as
possible” mentality. This push to perform as many of a particular service as possible does help
people, as more people are able to access the services provided by these organizations. However,
there is also another motive in doing many operations or administering a lot of vaccines. As
shown in the previous chapter, NGOs often publish annual reports that highlight the number of a
particular procedure administered or the number of people supported by food security programs.
These figures highlight the numerical successes of different projects while omitting true human
impacts of these programs. For example, one subject spoke of his work in a hospital in North
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Kivu, where an MSF mission had a 100 percent postoperative infection rate, which is very rare.
In this case, the reporting on numbers of operations completely omits the failure of the mission.
Additionally, while there are some French NGOs that focus mainly on emergency response,
others concentrate more on development. The traditional French NGOs known for emergency
response are MSF, MDM, ACF, and Handicap International. Cumming notes that these
urgenciers are “internationally renowned for their professionalism” (Cumming 2008). These
French NGOs have become multinational and are known for their professionalism. However,
even though the main goal of these NGOs is emergency response, they are increasingly
becoming involved in advocacy and development.
While INGOs are often lauded for their professionalism and structured organization,
many participants critiqued NGOs for falling short. The organization of these INGOs is clearly
complex, and the degree to which all members of the organizations subscribe to this idea of
professionalism varies. For example, one participant who had done multiple missions in several
African and Asian countries commented on the variability between missions, especially with
respect to the personalities of staff on the mission itself. He explains that, “A lot of these people
are sort of temporary. They'll work for six months, a year. There's not a lot of professionalism.
Or they move from place to place. So, it depends on who is the team leader? Who is the medical
coordinator? Who is the head of mission?” (Interview on 2 February 2021). Many subjects who
worked with the same organization had very different experiences depending on their mission
and team, but they spoke to the overarching trend that most personnel are temporary. With
personnel consistently changing over, questions are raised about the longevity and
professionalism of the organization. As the participant went on to explain: “It just varies. In a
way, it’s unfortunate because you would think there would be a common strategy. And that's the
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point of having a mission statement-- Is that you're on the same page... but you know, you're
not.” While INGOs continue to stress their organization’s professionalism, the short duration of
many personnel and lack of common strategy underscores their assertion.
The international operation of many NGOs tends to last for several years, rather than
quickly responding to a conflict and leaving. Many subjects from different NGOs talked about
the lack of exit strategies in the missions they worked on. One subject describes how NGOs are
likely to maintain operations in a country as long as funding continues, saying:
Ils sont là pour plusieurs années. Maintenant, par exemple, quand je cite l'exemple
d'Action Contre la Faim... le département de nutrition, le département de sécurité
alimentaire, etc. Cela veut dire qu’ils sont là tant qu'il y a financement pour les
départements... Toutes les équipes techniques ont les contrats pour les projets... S’il n’y a
plus de financement, malheureusement, ils ne sont pas là. (Interview on 16 March 2021)7
This highlights the relationship between financing and the duration that NGOs stay active in a
region, which was touched upon in the previous chapter. However, this quote clearly shows that
NGOs oftentimes establish themselves for long periods of time. These organizations employ
local employees, which benefits local communities because it provides jobs and services to the
populations. This quote also shows that NGOs operate similarly to multinational corporations in
the sense that they continue operation as long as the money continues to flow. NGOs arguably
provide the best services when able to access the greatest amount of funding. However, this
quote shows how the overall structure of NGOs in the humanitarian aid sector resembles a large
multinational corporation rather than smaller and local organizations working primarily at the
local level.
While there is a level of agreement that NGOs continue to operate where money is

“They are there for several years. Now, for example, when I cite the example of Action contre la faim… the
nutrition department, the food security departments, etc. That is to say that there are there as long as there is funding
for the departments… All the technical teams have contracts for their projects… If there is no more funding,
unfortunately, they are not there.” (translation by author)
7
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present, the opinions on the continual presence of NGOs in African countries varies
considerably. The participant quoted above commented on the persistence of NGOs, but also
noted that it would be bad for local communities if funding dried up and an organization had to
pack up and leave. Other participants have a more pessimistic view of the continual presence of
NGOs, saying:
So, there's no official exit strategy. No one, no one has an exit strategy. Any NGO that
tells you they have an exit strategy is absolutely full of [crap]. ACF is there as long as the
money's there, and every NGO is there as long as the money is there, basically. I think it's
important to note that at this point, the vast majority of humanitarian work is contracting.
(Interview on 5 February 2021a)
Exit strategies are important because they dictate an NGO will leave a situation, but they are
oftentimes superfluous statements about an organization’s plans to leave. This participant
highlights the discrepancies between the official statement of exit strategies and the reality of
donor funding models. As expressed in both quotes, the NGOs are present as long as there is
funding available to continue operations. As discussed in the earlier chapter, the donor funding
model incentivizes NGOs to stay in operation for as long as possible. The continued presence of
NGOs in African countries creates dependency structures that affect local capabilities to provide
for their people.
Dependency
Flows of aid from the West to countries in Africa often includes conditionalities and
creates dependency structures where poor countries are dependent on wealthy Western nations
for financial support. NGOs participate in the channeling of aid from Western countries to poorer
countries by acting as intermediaries. Issa G. Shivji explains that “the so-called NGO sector,
which is presented as pro-poor and morally driven, legitimises the essentially exploitative
capitalist system while the progressive agenda of people-driven development (radical, populist
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agenda of the nationalists of yesteryear) is co-opted” (Shivji 2008c). By acting as an
intermediary in the flow of aid into Africa, NGOs participate in the creation of dependency
structures that make local governments reliant on aid. A lack of training and capacity-building
further solidifies the presence of NGOs by justifying their presence. By viewing locals as
inferior, the Western countries are co-opting the agency of local people and governments to
address the problems inherent in their society that have resulted from European and Western
colonialism and neo-colonialism. While promoting a humanitarian agenda, NGOs act as
benevolent, neutral actors on the global stage.
As shown earlier, organizations have different opinions on the need to train local
personnel and improve infrastructure. As one interview participant explains,
It's hard. Like, it's to an extent, I mean, you know, it stated mission was to reduce hunger
and malnutrition. And it did work to do that… Are structurally things changing? No, you
know, was, like, where the root causes of hunger really being tackled? No. But… it
wasn't working against it. (Interview on 5 February 2021a)
This quote exemplifies much of what other interviews participants expressed in their interviews:
NGOs may work to achieve their mission, but they do not go much further to actually address
structural issues. The local population does benefit from projects to reduce hunger and
malnutrition, vaccinate populations for Malaria, and treat HIV with antiretrovirals. However,
because the structural factors are not addressed, people in Africa will continue to require NGO
and Western aid to continue providing these provisions. This participant ultimately left the NGO
sector because “we didn’t have a whole lot of successes” in impacting substantial change. The
inability, or lack of desire at the structural level, to address structural factors at the macro level
means that NGOs will continue to act as a band-aid over deeper issues. This perpetuates a cycle
of African states’ dependency on the inflow of Western aid and personnel.
Another factor that contributes to the establishment of dependency structures is the lack
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training to promote the capacity-building of local populations by international organizations. As
discussed in the previous section, the general lack of exit strategies perpetuates NGO presence
and solidifies dependency structures. Even so, there are instances where NGOs lose funding,
close missions, or respond to crises elsewhere. As one subject describes,
When you leave, you're part of the problem. And this happened… during the Civil War in
Sierra Leone. Surgical care was actually better during the Civil War, then for about five
years afterwards, because you have all these organizations and all these groups coming in
providing care. And then hostility stopped and ‘Okay, we're gonna leave.’ And so, to
transition to that is difficult. (Interview on 2 February 2021)
This quote shows that even though NGOs provide necessary medical care, they leave gaps when
they leave. The Civil War in Sierra Leone raged for eleven years and ravaged the country, but
the need for international assistance did not stop with hostilities ended. Sierra Leone is one of the
poorest countries in the world, and many residents struggled to recover from the intense violence
and destruction. While Sierra Leone is not part of Francophone West Africa, this story highlights
how NGO presence within a country creates a dependency, even when and perhaps especially
because they are providing essential services.
Much of the discussion around dependency structures upheld by NGOs fits into the larger
neocolonial apparatus that prioritizes Western interests over the true and autonomous
development of countries in Africa. One humanitarian aid worker described this dilemma by
saying:
If the question is, [is] all [this] money somehow hampering the natural development of
health systems in those countries... somehow, yes, I think. I mean, we are very much
aware that when we arrive in a specific context and we provide free-of-charge medical
care, you are somehow... damaging the little health center that is living out of the fees
that people pay for the consultations... big moral dilemma that health care should be for
free, so we provide it for free. But those health workers that are trying to sustain a system
in the long term can only live out of what people pay for their services... On the macro
level, there are a lot of different theories about whether humanitarian aid is actually
helping or stopping the real development. (Interview on 1 March 2021)
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The subject highlights a systemic problem within the entire humanitarian system, which also has
moral implications. In providing free medical care to local populations, the local capacity to
respond to crises becomes diminished. Several participants spoke of people travelling hundreds
of miles to receive free medical care, which severely disrupts the local health care systems that
rely on incoming patients. By providing free medical care, NGOs are pulling patients from local
businesses and disrupting the generally fragile infrastructure already in place. However, these
organizations are providing essential medical care to local populations that they would not be
able to access elsewhere. This subject has worked in the humanitarian aid sector for over ten
years and recognizes the moral quandaries that persist within the larger humanitarian aid
apparatus. The dependency structures generated by the presence of NGOs mirrors and
contributes to a larger neocolonial apparatus that benefits Western liberal interests and the cost of
the development of poorer countries. As Issa G. Shivji explains, “NGOs cannot be pro-people
and pro-change without being anti-imperialist and anti-status quo” (Shivji 2008c).
Who should be in charge?
Due to the complex international structures of INGOs, there is often disagreement over
who is best suited to formulate plans that will also have the best outcomes for the target
populations. This disconnect exists in many different organizations, according to the participants
interviewed for the project. As explained earlier in the chapter, the size and administration of
these organizations create multiple pathways for communication. One subject described the
decision-making process in a British NGO as directed from the affiliates, even though much of
the programs are formulated at the local level. The subject explained that the Senegal branch of
this NGO wants to become an affiliate—like the United States or France—to have more
autonomy in decision making practices. The complicated chain of command makes it difficult

70

for local offices to take full control of their programs. However, the subject did express that the
Senegal office might struggle without the U.S. office’s fundraising efforts. Another participant
expressed a similar sentiment, regarding the communication between administration and country
level staff as positive, but imperfect. As he explains, “Moi je dirais, en mon expérience, que
franchement ça c'est pas à 100%. Selon moi, parfois entre deux opinions et parfois ça diffère.
Mais, en termes de collaborations de travail, à 90% c'est okay, quoi.”8 This difference of opinion
often exists between people working at the country level and administrators working in affiliate
offices or at the international headquarters.
While there is a chain of command raising from lower level country offices to affiliates,
operational centers, and international headquarters, the level of contact between them varies
between organization and project. One subject describes the contact between the country office
in Gabon and the headquarters as:
Minimal contact. I can’t say they were overly engaged in the work I was doing. At one
point we asked for some technical assistance, someone who was familiar with setting up
these prosthetic centers, I didn’t have that specific experience, and they did make
someone available to come on mission to work with me. They were quite responsive to
requests but there was not a lot of ongoing day to day contact. (Interview on 1 February
2021)
On the one hand, this allows local staff to pursue missions that they feel will best support their
beneficiaries. Also, the interview participant explained that the NGO was amenable to the local
office’s needs but was not overly attentive to the day-to-day operation of the NGO. However, a
lack of contact can be detrimental when headquarters makes decisions without involving local
staff. This particular mission was shut down due to a lack of funding, but many of the staff in the
Gabon office were not included in the decision-making process and were quite surprised to learn

8

I would say, in my experience, that honestly it is not 100%. According to me, sometimes between two opinions
and sometimes they differ. But in terms of work collaborations, 90% of the time it’s okay.” (translation by author)
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of the closing of the entire mission. This situation highlights one of the major questions about the
administration and structure of NGOs, namely whether decisions should be made at the local
level or the international level.
Opposing views about who should make the decisions exist for many large INGOs. One
perspective, which is often held by fieldworkers and local staff, is that the administration often
makes decisions that impede a mission’s ability to perform the way it should. In explaining the
origins and organization of one French NGO, one subject describes,
MSF now has very few surgical products. They've gotten into HIV and Malaria and TB
and all these other things. That's where the donor money is. So, they've expanded what
they do, they also like to be in all these countries, because it sounds good to be in 70
countries. So, they have a footprint. So yeah, it's, you know, so internally, and then the
way that the internal structure works, is you... And it's so [messed] up. Because the, the
technical expertise, the medical people are not in charge. (Interview on 2 February
2021)
This participant speaks of the expansion of MSF from their early stages, where the organization
was focused on surgery, to its current wide-reaching programs. He also shows that donor
money influences what actions NGOs take and what causes they pursue. Finally, this
participant critiques the organization because the people with technical expertise, including the
doctors, are not the ones in charge. This organization, like many others, places decision making
in the hands of administration rather than people working on the ground with local
communities.
Another participant, who works with the same organization but has had experience in
the administrative capacity as well as at the field level, explains the division inherent in the
organization. She describes that “it's also a matter of perspective” and that:
Sometimes… People on the field have a much better understanding of what is actually
happening, what are the needs. They are more in contact with the local community. So,
they have a better overview about the specific needs in that area. But people in the
headquarters have a better general overview of what are the needs and we are using our
resources in [a] different context. So that's why people in HQ… have to sometimes
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make decisions that sometimes in the field are not appreciated or they don't agree with.
It's also because they are taken out of a larger perspective. (Interview on 1 March 2021)
This participant highlights the difficult relationship between people working on the ground and
in the administration without claiming that one opinion is better than the other. The sources of
disconnect and tension between these two groups rests in the structure of the organization itself.
At the field level, there is a better understanding of the local context, which includes better
knowledge of the most pressing issues and the desires of the local communities. However, this
level of understanding only goes as far the local staff can communicate, interact, and
understand local patients and communities. For the decisions made at the macro-level, the
participant points to budgetary constraints as a reason for this disconnect. The organization
must have funding that covers all its operations, and when decisions are made that affect a
particular project, local field staff are dissatisfied and blame the administration. However, this
issue is underscored by the fact that these organizations operate within a structure that funnels
wealth from Western countries into African economies and creates dependency structures based
on these funds.
Another factor that contributes to how decisions are made in these large organizations is
the difference between temporary personnel and career humanitarian aid workers. One subject
describes the structure in NGOs that pulls people in to be careerist and continue within the
organization at an administrative level, saying:
I think part of it is that the organization has this cache, and people, they will always have
more people come in. Right, so they don't need expertise, because they have the
expertise. And the people that stayed within, and they're fairly good. If you do a couple
missions, they'll find a job for you. And you become HR… and so you can make a bit of
a career out of it. And if you look internally, at MSF, it's called Doctors Without Borders.
But… doctors are a very small part of the whole operation. (Interview on 2 February
2021)
As this participant explains, people make careers out of working in the humanitarian sector. For
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example, one Italian NGO paid workers very well when compared to other NGOs but also when
compared to nursing positions back in Italy. As the participant describes, “because the nurses
stayed longer than the doctors” due to the high salaries, “they felt that they were more qualified.”
He remembered his time working with this organization in Sierra Leone, saying “I actually
almost got into a fist fight with one of the ICU nurses… over patient management. I mean, it
was crazy stuff. And he ended up becoming the head of the hospital because he stayed there
longer.” MSF pays considerably less, but people are still able to make careers out of working in
the humanitarian aid sector. When considering this in terms of decision making, the people who
have more experience with the organization make the calls. However, they may not have the
technical expertise, even though they worked within the organization for a long time. Thus, the
emphasis rests on the organization and its reputation rather than being able to provide the best
care possible at the local level.
Conclusion
As this chapter shows, the bureaucratization of French INGOs—which coincides with an
increase in size and administrative structures—contributes to uphold neo-colonial structures.
These INGOs promote a professionalized and efficient organization that works to address crises
and injustices. However, the reality of these organizations is much more complex. Through
administration and bureaucracy, these large INGOs uphold structures that benefit large interests,
attract donors, and create hierarchical power systems that benefit the interests of international
donors, western public opinion, and the INGOs over the beneficiaries.
When looking at the observable implications outlined to test the hypothesis for this
chapter, I find a link between bureaucratization and neo-colonial systems. The first observable
implication, lack of exit strategy, was found to exist. Participant accounts stressed the fact that
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NGOs will continue working on a project for as long as funding is possible. This permanence of
NGOs reinforces dependency of local populations. Next, this chapter found there to be a
disconnect between staff working in the field and staff working in headquarters. Many
participants criticized the international and higher-level administration of being distant or
making decisions that detracts from work happening on the ground. Finally, there was substantial
evidence pointing toward the existence of career humanitarian aid workers. Participants spoke of
people staying with an organization for long enough to be promoted to administrative positions.
On the other hand, participants also mentioned a lack of professionalism of expatriate staff on
certain missions, which is exacerbated by the short duration of some of these positions,
particularly in medical INGOs. The data therefore strongly suggests that increases in
bureaucratization lead to greater neo-colonial activity through operations that mirror an MNC
and create dependency structures where African countries are dependent on Western aid.
The bureaucratization of INGOs is closely tied to the donor funding model that links
organizations and donors. The cycle is perpetuated: donors support large reputable organizations,
and NGOs grow both as a result of funding and in order to earn more funding later on. As these
INGOs grow, acquire more funding, and solidify their global influence, the asymmetrical power
dynamic between Western liberal and Africa continues to increase. The following chapter looks
at NGOs in the global era and shows how globalization and the end of the Cold War have shaped
NGO activity. The chapter also addresses insensitivity, capacity building, and some of the human
elements present in humanitarian aid.
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Chapter 4: NGOs in the Global Era?
The Drill in North Kivu
When conceptualizing the role for NGOs in the globalized era, particularly after the end
of the Cold War in 1991, it is important to look at which elements of the NGO model remain
relevant or have become outdated. Two subjects who both worked for the same French NGO told
a story that illustrates not only the disconnect between administration and the work happening in
the field, but the capacity for gross insensitivity exhibited by expatriate staff. The doctor, who
experienced this event firsthand, was working in North Kivu during a time of relative stability
and peace. The staff in the hospital got word that fighting had broken out. People were not made
aware that this was just a drill planned by the administrator, and “all the local staff freaked out
because they thought that the fighting had started. And the scenario was how fighting had started
in the past.” They brought in an ambulance and executed the drill, but local staff were extremely
distressed. The doctor described their reactions, explaining: “I mean, talk about trigger points
and PTSD and rekindling. I mean, staff were crying. They couldn't get in contact with their
families. They didn't know what was going on.” These people have lived through years of
extreme instability and violence, none of which was considered by the administrator from
headquarters.
The subject also explained his extreme anger that the organization decided to conduct a
drill in such an insensitive and unnecessary manner. The doctor explained that “there was
nothing of value added by making this a surprise event. Nothing” (Interview on 2 February
2021). If the organization had wanted to test the system, then they could have told everyone and
most of what they wanted to accomplish would have occurred. However, the organization
emphasized the importance of the organizational structure and doing things by this NGO’s
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standard while completely disregarding the local context and the possible consequences. This
story also highlights how NGOs often enter a country and begin working without an adequate
understanding of the local context. The conditions in many of these places are very different
from the countries where these INGOs are headquartered, which can lead to gross insensitivity
and a mindset that Western countries are superior.
Building off of the two previous chapters, this chapter focuses on the role and legitimacy
of NGOs in the post-Cold War era. The role of NGOs is evolving with the increasing
interconnectedness of the world through global liberal trade. As Issa G. Shiva writes, “NGOs
were born in the womb of neo-liberalism and knowingly or otherwise are participating in the
imperial project, or at least in the process of refurbishing its image” (Shivji, 2008c). As Shivji
explains, the origins and growth of NGOs have risen with neoliberalism, as they have increased
in size and evolved in capabilities. This chapter will analyze whether or not NGOs continue to be
relevant in the world today and to what extent they perpetuate neo-colonial structure systems.
First, this chapter will look more into instances of insensitivity and racism and then further
explore dependency structures. Next, this chapter will look into training practices. Finally, the
chapter will analyze whether NGOs can still remain neutral and the status of their position in the
world today.
Racism and Insensitivity
One facet of neo-colonialism is the imposition of Western values and structures on other
countries, and NGOs participate in this shaping of cultural practices. The previous chapters have
discussed how structural factors contribute to the perpetuation of neo-colonial values, but neocolonialism also works to alter the culture of local communities. NGOs often portray the image
of the “ médecin blanc soignant un enfant noir n’est pas pour rien dans la perception publique de
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‘l’humanitaire’ : celle d’un engagement bénévole et non gouvernemental de professionnels,
notamment médicaux, au contact direct de population souffrants” (Dauvin and Siméant 2002).9
They often portray white saviors to increase the image of the NGO through media outlets and
publications. However, NGOs often enter into a situation where the context is drastically
different than that in their headquarters’ countries, and Western models do not work in these new
situations. As the story about the drill in North Kivu exemplifies, there are instances where an
adherence to NGO protocol rooted in Western culture causes more harm than good and fails to
function in a different context.
When asking participants about whether or not they felt that French NGOs were
insensitive to the local culture, many responded that the organizations were respectful and that
expatriates caused most issues. For example, one subject explained a French NGO policy,
saying: “when it came to things like… respecting holidays, making sure that people could… do
pilgrimages… We were adjusting to the schedules for Ramadan. And things like that, for the
most part, I found were pretty good. I mean… at the local level, like when you get to the country
offices, the vast majority of staff are local” (Interview on 5 February 2021a). At the country level
offices in this NGO, local staff hold administrative roles and HR positions that have the power to
dictate cultural practices. Because of this, the organization itself is understandably in tune with
the local culture. However, expatriate technical staff can cause issues within the organization.
This sentiment is mirrored by many accounts from other humanitarian aid workers. In
combination with the composition of country offices, many INGOs use contracting with local
organizations to implement projects, which requires an understanding of local culture. As one

“the white doctor treating a black child is not for nothing in the public perception of ‘humanitarianism’: that of the
benevolent engagement et non-government-professionals, notably doctors, in direct contact with suffering
populations.” (translation by author)
9
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local staff member in the Senegal office of a French NGO explained : “ils sont sensibles parce
qu'elles, pour que le projet sera [un succès] ... la culture de chaque région... ils sont souvent
obligés d'intégrer les acteurs locaux” (Interview on 16 March 2021).10 In order to effectively
partner with local organizations, NGOs must have some level of cultural awareness of the local
context. However, this sensitivity to local culture makes sense when the majority of staff at the
country office are local.
Even though the global NGO structure allows for a level of sensitivity to local culture,
there is variation among NGOs and among staff. Many participants spoke of problems related to
expatriate staff, who could be insensitive, ignorant, and racist. One doctor told a story that
exemplifies expatriate feelings of superiority towards the local communities. While working in
an MSF mission in North Kivu with a 100 percent postoperative infection rate, the expatriate
surgeon confronted other expatriate staff with racist and dangerous attitudes toward local
populations and capacities. The surgeon before explained that all dressings must be done in the
operating room with a half bottle of hydrogen peroxide to avoid infection. The participant
remembered the interaction:
I started to look into that. And I went to the head of the mission, who… had been there
for maybe six months or so. But she had done one other mission in Haiti, and so she felt
that she was experienced. And I told her, I said, “hey, you know, we've got this, this
infection problem.” And she said, “yeah, well, it's a dirty African hospital.” (Interview on
2 February 2021)
This quote highlights the extreme racism exhibited by the expatriate head of mission in North
Kivu. Instead of interrogating why the postoperative infection rate was so high, the nurses were
told to wash the walls of the hospital because it was “a dirty African hospital.” However, the
interview participant easily figured out that the new autoclave was defective. The other

“They are sensitive because for the project to be a success… the culture of each region… they are often obligated
to integrate local actors” (translation by author)
10
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expatriate staff claimed to have already checked the autoclave and claimed it worked. However,
as soon as the surgeon mandated that the brand-new autoclave, which cost 90,000 euro, was not
working and that they must sterilize instruments over a charcoal fire, the infection problem went
away. This story highlights how preconceptions of African countries can be dangerous, because
MSF was actually making people worse in this situation. The surgeon said that the expatriate
staff were claiming that they were providing MSF-quality services to the local patients, but
people might have been safer if they had not come into the hospital in the first place.
Another expatriate doctor had a very different view about the work that this particular
organization was doing and how it treated local culture. He describes the organization as having
an outreach office, which focused on how to systematically address issues of maternal mortality.
He also spoke about interactions with local Imams and village elders to discuss their needs and
what they wanted to see from the organization. Additionally, the staff would talk to the elders
and local leadership to try to convey what they were doing and how it would help local women.
The local leadership would then disseminate the organization’s mission to their wives and
daughters. These actions point to a level of cultural sensitivity toward local needs and desires.
This participant also claims that the organization always comes to see what the needs of the local
population are before establishing a mission. While this particular account points to a positive
image of this organization's work with respect to adhering to local cultural practices, this
realistically varies between mission and countries. As other workers within the same
organization pointed out, these practices were not always standard practice. Additionally, the
influence of donor funding in dictating the projects that organizations can pursue can be more
limiting in some contexts than others.
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Several interview participants spoke to the diversification of the NGO sector, with
expatriate staff coming from more places than just Europe and the United States. As one worker
described,
I was the lone American in each of them. Most of the people were from everywhere else.
You know, I think it’s kind of Eurocentric a little bit. But there were people from Egypt,
South America. So, the groups that I was in there might have been one or two Americans,
but it wasn’t the majority. Probably the largest number was from France, in general, but
there were mostly from everywhere else. (Interview on 10 February 2021)
There is a diversification of the humanitarian aid sector, with doctors and expatriate staff coming
from Latin America and Africa as well as from the traditional sources of Europe and the United
States. While this participant notes a large number of French workers on his two missions, other
interviewers did not speak to that same experience. Nevertheless, a diversification in the NGO
sector resembles the globalization and growth of these organizations.
While many participants referenced instances where expatriate staff acted entitled,
insensitive, and racist toward the local culture, few spoke about attempts to address these
systemic issues. One participant spoke of discrimination and how the organization deals with
differences, stating:
Altogether as an organization, we're quite open. But I realize more and more that it's
probably not true because we all come with our burden of some racism, some fear
towards who is different from us. We can't neglect that part that is, kind of, innate, plus
we work with... 40 thousand people … So of course, an organization is done by the
people that work with them. So, within this 40 thousand there are all sorts of people. So
yes... I think we have more of a problem of power between the international staff and the
national staff because international staff, by default, have positions that are higher in the
hierarchy than the local staff, with exceptions of course. (Interview on 1 March 2021)
This participant highlighted some of the problems inherent in the international system, noting
that expatriate staff come with preconceived notions of what other cultures look like. As a few
participants explained, some expatriate staff were ignorant to local culture while others were
outright racist. This is not true for all international staff but can be a real problem. Additionally,

81

the participant spoke about the power dynamics between international staff and the national staff,
who hold lower positions within the organization. Of the participants who mentioned issues with
racism, most spoke of problematic staff rather than the entire system. However, this quote clearly
outlines a power dynamic that exists between international and national staff and shows that the
system clearly upholds an unequal structure.
When asked about what the organization is doing to addresses instances of
discrimination, the participant responded that there is no formal training about these issues.
Instead she explains,
Usually we get a cultural briefing once we get in the country... and they're like “this is
what you should not do here" or “this is how you should behave to be more welcome in
the community.” It's mostly related to practical things--how to greet. [These kinds] of
little things that can make a big difference in your daily life. But it's also about the
general overview, like how people react, and usually it's based on things that happen in
the past, these kinds of misunderstandings. But no, we don't have a formal training.
(Interview on 1 March 2021)
There are steps taken to address cultural differences at the country level, which is important and
helps to avoid instances where ignorance results in a larger problem. However, the lack of
training on larger issues of insensitivity, discrimination, and racism shows that the organization
does not view these issues as significant problems. While this participant also stressed the
growing diversification within the organization, with personnel travelling from all over to work
on different missions, this does not address the issues of discrimination and racism that exist.
While these organizations enter with the good intentions to help local populations fight
hunger, disease, and other crises, they often discount local expertise. Many participants spoke of
organizations hiring young and inexperienced expatriate staff over experienced local staff. One
participant cited ACTED as an example, saying “they typically recruit people straight out of
university… and put them in positions of leadership… You'll get this like, you know, 22-year-
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old like French guy who's in charge of logistics, and he's like supervising national staff that are
like, you know, in their 40s and 50s” (Interview on 5 February 2021a ). Therefore, it is common
for local knowledge and expertise is sidelined by expatriate staff who have little training,
experience, or cultural knowledge. This disregard for local expertise was highlighted by a story
that another participant told of his time working with IRC in Indonesia after the 2005 tsunami.
While working alongside a few expatriate staff, they confided that they have a saying that goes:
“you may be expat, but I'm expert.” This saying highlights the power dynamic that is often
created between expatriate knowledge and local expertise, the latter of which is often sidelined
and devalued. Even though IRC is not a French NGO and Indonesia is not part of this study, this
quote illustrates the pervasive and dangerous attitudes of the humanitarian aid sector that
prioritizes international knowledge over local expertise.
Who should get treated?
Another major issue regarding the work of NGOs in poor countries is the decision on
who should get access to the service. Particularly when NGOs are engaging in developmental
practices, the choices that organizations make always benefit one population while leaving out
others. As one participant working with a French NGO explained:
Of course, we cannot cover all the needs. We have to choose, and every time you choose,
you leave somebody out. So sometimes we invest on malnourished children because…
that's the big priority, and it probably is the big priority... and then you have pregnant
women just nearby that are not covered. Or you focus on conflict, you know, mass
casualty and emergency room for the wounded and then you totally neglect... you know,
communicable disease, chronic conditions. (Interview on 1 March 2021)
This clearly highlights one of the major problems within the humanitarian sector: there will
always be people that will not be reached by NGOs. Some people will not receive medical care,
while others will get access to clean drinking water but are simultaneously struggling to deal
with communicable diseases. As the participant went on to say, “you always make a choice
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because you cannot totally replace the system, and you have to face the reality that there are
some people just nearby that you cannot help.” The NGO sector is not a replacement for a
functioning health system or sufficient infrastructure. In countries where many people live in
poverty, NGOs cannot address all the specified needs. However, these countries cannot rise in
the global economic system because their resources and personnel continue to be extracted and
directed by outside interests.
Another participant spoke of how the mission focused approach of the NGO he worked at
as being occasionally limiting. As a short-time staff member, he described the organization as
having a tendency to limit the goals of missions, with the goal of his particular mission being to
decrease infant mortality. However, he explained: “I wanted to do other stuff while I was there,
but I was reminded of the goal” (Interview on 10 February 2021). Many humanitarian workers
described a similar situation of wanting to help people outside the tight consigns of the mission.
Another humanitarian worker with the same NGO spoke about the limitations of operating under
a strict project mission, saying that “there was this Cholera outbreak and MSF was short on
doctors. So, I was like… we've got this training project. We've got a local surgeon. He's doing
great. I'm going to go over and help the Cholera center, where they actually need help. And that
upset the expat operating room nurse, even though the head of mission there was fine with it”
(Interview on 2 February 2021). This experience highlights a limited level of flexibility with
respect to the mission’s goals. Flexibility was accorded because the head of mission was
amenable to working for changing needs. However, this flexibility clearly does not exist in all
missions.
NGOs cannot address all needs, and that is not their role. Their presence, however,
provides essential services while continuing the system of domination by Western imperial
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interests. NGOs are justified because their involvement helps local communities, but not enough
that these communities are able to function on their own. As money flows into countries,
dependency structures are created that subjects local populations to continue requiring western
support while being simultaneously exploited by Western economic interests.
NGOs and neutrality
Looking at the origins of many international urgenciers, like MSF and MDM, the main
goal was to remain neutral to the demands of local and international governments. During the
Cold War era, it was easier to remain neutral because the global political stage operated in a
bipolar climate between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the origins of the
humanitarian aid sector, “the nongovernmental nature of NGOs meant that they could operate
despite political pressure.” (Chandler 2001). However, after the fall of the Soviet Union, global
politics became much more complex and the ability for NGOs to remain neutral changed. As one
participant pointed out, “the whole NGO model is a Cold War remnant where you had a
humanitarian space” (Interview on 2 February 2021) However, as the global order became more
complicated and conditions have changed. As the participant elaborated, “But that [space] sort of
doesn't exist. So, you know, it used to be that you can negotiate with both sides and say, you
know, I'm neutral, I'm in the middle, I'm going to take care of everyone. But [how do] you do
that, when there is no battlefield, there's no front line. And so that's a little bit complicated. And
so, security, I think has become worse.” Due to the shifting global politics, the role of NGOs has
shifted as well, and they cannot remain neutral in the same way as before. This participant also
emphasized that security has become worse, which makes it difficult for NGOs to intervene in
crises and safely conduct their work. The place for NGOs in this globalized era is up for debate,
with some seeing them as a remnant of the past and others believing that NGOs can evolve.
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The whole concept of neutrality rests on the idea that NGOs can enter into an area of
conflict or crises without taking either of the sides of the opposing parties. This allows NGOs to
provide the best care for populations affected by the conflict. For example, when looking at the
origins of the Red Cross, David Chandler explains that “The principle of impartiality derived
from the desire to assist without discrimination except on the basis of needs, giving priority to
the most urgent cases of distress” (Chandler 2001). However, the shift away from neutrality
coincides with a “new humanitarianism,” as Chandler describes the phenomenon of human rights
becoming more political. As one participant explained, “Often organizations supporting them are
also constrained in the types of services they can provide. Constrained by the donors or
constrained by the host government that can also put a lot of hoops to jump through to access
certain services.” Increased difficulty to work within the constraints designated by the host
governments, coupled with the more complex nature of international relations has made it more
difficult for NGOs to operate in a neutral fashion. Another participant working in the Senegal
office for a British NGO explained,
All the NGOs are supporting the strategy and the government policy. But in some ways,
we have to be, like, doing kind of influencing. Influencing the government policy, for
like, those people like women's, young people, marginalized people. So, we have to do
some kind of influencing on the level of government. But, given that we are here in
Africa, it is very difficult to be face to face with the government. They are very powerful.
So, what we do is, kind of, do what is very important for NGO is do some kind of
research, have some kind of evidence to show the government: these are the facts, and
this is what we want you to do. Like, partnering with a government in order to influence
them. (Interview on 4 February 2021)
As this participant explains, NGOs engaging in advocacy are forced to work with the local
government to insight change. Even though NGOs often claim to work outside the purview of
governments and international politics, they are also forced to work with host governments to
affect certain changes and advocate for marginalized people.
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The “new humanitarianism” of INGOs, NGOs, and advocacy groups also creates an order
where organizations are becoming more involved and vocal in the occurrences of local
governments. The “new humanitarian” agenda promoted “subsidiary of sovereignty” or “right of
intervention” as well as “freedom of criticism” or “denunciation” (Chandler 2001). Thus,
humanitarian aid has become increasingly political. As the participant above explained, it is
essential to work with country governments to insight change, which is an inherently political
act. When MSF won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1999, Dr. James Orbinski explained that “as an
independent volunteer association, we are committed to bringing direct medical aid to people in
need. But we act not in a vacuum, and we speak not into the wind, but with a clear intent to
assist, to provoke change, or to reveal injustice” (International Activity Report 2019). No longer
is neutrality an important factor in being able to provide humanitarian assistance to people, as
political action and the freedom of criticism become the norm in the humanitarian aid sector. The
publications of popular NGOs today also illustrate this point. In MSF’s 2019 International
Activity Report, an article on the crises in the Sahel explains that “in this volatile context, access
for Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) and other humanitarian organisations has become
increasingly difficult, yet ever more urgent” (International Activity Report 2019). In response to
the increasing conflict, MSF takes the stance to protect ordinary civilians and solidifies its role in
responding to the conflict. Despite the violence, MSF is committed “to continuing our activities
in the region, assisting people in distress and fighting to preserve humanitarian principles and
space.” (MSF Annual Report 2019). MSF’s publications push its legitimacy upon the public and
positions the organization as the morally driven actor within situations of conflict. Similar
rhetoric can be found in annual reports published by ACF, MDM, and ACTED.
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Therefore, the NGOs and the humanitarian assistance sector has shifted from neutrality to
a more militant version of aid in the face of conflict. However, this rhetoric is guided by Western
principles and reinforces the need for Western involvement. As Chandler explains, “not only is
the more interventionist approach seen as a legitimate response to humanitarian crises in nonWestern states, it is increasingly understood to be nonpolitical and ethically driven” (Chandler
2001). This concept is again highlighted by Dr. Orbinski’s Nobel Prize acceptance speech, where
he also explained: “Let me say this very clearly: the humanitarian act is the most apolitical of all
acts, but if its actions and its morality are taken seriously, it has the most profound of political
implications. And the fight against impunity is one of these implications.” (Nobel Peace Prize
n.d.) These attitudes, which gained popularity after the end of the Cold War, also justify Western
intervention in countries under the name of humanitarian assistance. This rhetoric also places
Western governments and organizations as morally superior to countries where these conflicts
and crises occur. However, there is a lot of hypocrisy in this rhetoric. By condemning human
rights abuses abroad, NGOs and other organizations place blame on other countries without
recognizing the abuses that take place internally in the host countries of these organizations.
Additionally, these organizations rarely point to the true origins and reasons of different
conflicts, which are often the result of capitalism, neo-colonialism, colonialism, and liberalism.
By failing to address the systemic issues that created many inequalities, crises, and instability,
the Western international community absolves itself from the past crimes it has committed, like
colonialism. This all relates back to what Issa G. Shivji explained about the future of NGOs: they
cannot be pro-human without being anti-imperialist at the same time.
Looking toward the Future
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As NGOs become more political and involved in the international affairs of different
countries, they also face challenges in an attempt to remain relevant. Participants spoke of the
changing role of NGOs, particularly in the context of local capabilities and other factors. One
participant spoke of the evolving context that NGOs are faced with, stating that:
The states took a much proactive role in trying to deliver support for their populations.
That is very good. On the other side, we are faced with the fact that sometimes they don't
have the full capacity in many different ways, like resources, capacity, budget,
competence, etc. to deliver emergency response mainly… So somehow the space for
emergency response from international partners is somehow shrinking. (Interview on 1
March 2021)
As this participant explains, one of the evolving issues that NGOs face is a more proactive
approach by governments to address the issues of their populations. However, she acknowledges
that local governments still lack the resources to respond to emergencies, which is a result of
exploitative economic practices and outward cash flow from poorer countries to the West.
Another change that NGOs are facing, particularly medical response organizations is that “WHO
also became much more operational than it used to be in terms of emergency response to medical
emergencies, mainly outbreaks but not only, also disasters etc. So, they are also gaining in
capacity to respond” (Interview on 1 March 2021). With the World Health Organization
becoming more adept in responding to crises, the need for medical urgenciers is also shrinking.
Even though the space is shrinking, NGOs are continuing to adapt. Whether or not NGOs can
remain neutral is another question.
NGOs are facing this evolving context, but different participants disagreed over what this
means for the future of the humanitarian aid sector. As the participant cited above continued on
to explain,
I think it also makes us reflect on how we can be relevant in what we do. Because the
point is not necessarily to have a project...but to cover a gap. So, if there is no gap, that's
great. I mean, ideally… MSF should disappear because the states should cover for their
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own needs with some external help... and that there would be no need for international
medical organizations because the medical structure is capable of answering to all the
needs of the population. But, I mean, I think we are very far from that. (Interview on 1
March 2021)
This participant suggests that NGOs should become irrelevant someday as local governments are
able to provide for the needs of their citizens. However, it is not clear when this will occur,
especially as the global market economy continues to intervene in African economies in
extractive and exploitative ways. While MSF may work to fill a gap and those the gaps are
shrinking, it also does not work to fix the sources of crises, inequality, and conflict itself.
As NGOs adapt to remain relevant, there are still questions about whether they should
continue to exist in the first place. While NGOs claim to promote sustainable practices, such as
partnering with local organizations and investing in development, the usefulness of these actions
is limited by money and local governments. As one participant explained,
Of course, we have different situations, and depending on the context, but most of the
time, we really try to work with the local health system. So local hospitals, so trying to
reinforce local hospitals, local health centers... we also have international staff or what
we call delocalized staff, you know people may be coming from the capital to the rural
area. But we also work with the local staff. Because one of the points is: try to reinforce
the capacity. And when we leave, they will be able to somehow continue, because we
invest in training. Again, of course, the limitation is that they probably will not have the
material it takes to run the activities, the medical treatment... But yes, we mostly work in
partnership unless it is really not possible. (Interview on 1 March 2021)
This participant explains how this French NGO aims to partner with local hospitals as much as
possible, except in situations where that is not possible like when there are no local facilities or
there are security risks. However, she argues that by investing in training and capacity building,
local facilities should be able to continue operation even after the organization leaves. Having
more qualified doctors and improved facilities benefits local communities, as long as there is
funding available to pay local staff and purchase supplies.
Even if NGOs claim to be investing in training of local personnel, the extent to which
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that occurs varies greatly across projects. While some participants spoke positively of an NGOs
commitment to training the local populations, other participants critique expatriate staff for
believing themselves to be superior to local doctors and surgeons. One participant explained his
experience working with a French NGO in South Sudan, saying:
I was doing a training for the surgeons and there was a French operating room nurse, and
he was very upset with me because I wasn't doing these huge operations like the guy
before me had done. Even though the patients were dying in the operating room or
postoperatively because there were no nurses in the wards. You know, we were doing
these small cases and I was helping the local guys. (Interview on 2 February 2021)
Instead of stepping in and doing as many cases as possible, this surgeon focused on training local
doctors to do small cases. Doing large operations was unsustainable due to the lack of nursing
staff, so the surgeon focused on what was possible. This quote also highlights the varying views
of expatriate staff; while the French nurse believed that doing the greatest number of operations
would be best, the American surgeon wanted to focus on bolstering the local capacity in a
sustainable way. The fact that patients were dying due to lack of nursing staff after undergoing
big operations shows a fundamental issue with how this organization was approaching its role,
namely that big surgery does not help local patients if they are unable to safely recover
afterward. By failing to invest in local capacities and listen to local opinions, this NGO was
engaging in actions that were unsupportable by the local capabilities once the organization leaves
and international aid stops.
Investing in showy surgical programs without bolstering the support systems, like nursing
staff in the wards, is an ineffective and unsustainable option for local communities and points to
a gross misunderstanding of local contexts. As the American surgeon explained, “I was looking
at the denominator issue. How do we fix the needs of the population? And they were looking
more at the numerator. This one person will be helped by me. Which is true, but it's not going to
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help the whole population. So how do we figure out how to help the whole population?”
(Interview on 2 February 2021). Even though individual people are helped by a particular
procedure and surgery, there are many cases where continuing to provide these services is not
sustainable. For instance, when people are unable to recover safely due to a lack of nurses in the
ward, risky surgeries are unsustainable and dangerous. By going in and operating as one would
in a Western developed country, NGOs show a mentality of superiority and insensitivity to local
needs. Because this surgeon has a public health background, he focuses on the needs of the
population over those of the individual. In assuming that helping one person is better than
helping a community as a whole, NGOs are halting any opportunity for providing significant
improvements to local communities. While this paper cannot address the moral debate over
choosing who and how to treat people, addressing the needs of individuals instead of focusing on
systemic issues continues systems of dependence that places poorer countries below Western
liberal interests.
In addition to systemic issues that fail to address root causes of many issues, NGOs create
unequal opportunities for local populations. The act of hiring staff for missions is inherently
unequal, as some people will benefit from NGO jobs while others will not. When asked how the
participant thinks that local populations do the work of a particular NGO, she responded saying:
I think it's definitely more complicated than yes, I get free drugs and yes, I get treated.
Because it's a big mix, you're also bringing a lot of money to the communities. They're
paying salaries. The way we are selecting our staff on the fields is a big challenge for the
community. How do you choose the guards, the cook, the drivers, you know... can also
create tensions and that's something you need to keep in mind every time. So, I would say
in general the perception is quite positive, but it's also complex. (Interview on 1 March
2021)
Even though receiving free medical care benefits the local population, the organization’s other
operations can cause dissatisfaction in the larger community. Coming into a country and hiring
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local staff will inevitably disenfranchise some people. Even with a relatively positive image, the
general operations of the organization also affect local populations. The same participant
expressed how the NGO oftentimes takes people from other areas of the country to provide care.
While this benefits people receiving care at the mission’s headquarters, it may be creating gaps
elsewhere in the country.
As the participant describes, providing these services is “an easy win. We provide
medical care for free and the level is normally quite good, especially compared to what they are
used to” (Interview on 1 March 2021). However, despite this positive reception, structures of
dependency can be established. An American surgeon in South Sudan describes being confused
why a mission was doing so many thyroid operations, and:
I started asking around, like so, what's going on with the thyroid things. Why? What's up?
And they started to confide in me that a thyroid operation cost 250 in Khartoum. So, what
was happening was, since I was the American surgeon in Malakal, people were flying
down to Malakal to have surgery by the American surgeon for only 100 dollars.
(Interview on 2 February 2021)
While previous surgeons working in the hospital had no issue doing so many thyroid operations,
this doctor decided to ask around more to understand the causes of the problem. Another
interview participant described people coming from all over to access the services provided by
this organization, and people would travel from Niger into Nigeria to receive care. The
organization had a reputation for providing good services with reputable international doctors, so
people would pay money to travel to receive free services rather than pay for the operation to
occur closer to home. This creates dependency on international staff and organizations to provide
quality healthcare while simultaneously pulling resources from other locales in the country.
While this structure of dependency is created, there are benefits attributed to the presence
of NGOs beyond just the people receiving treatment, access to clean water, and other services
provided by humanitarian aid organizations. As one local staff at the country level office of a
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French NGO in Senegal commented, “Il y a un bon rapport, la qualité de travail. Il y a un bon
rapport d'équipe des personnes. La déjà... ça permet aussi d'avoir un esprit d'ouverture...
beaucoup de régions, beaucoup de conférences” (Interview on 16 March 2021)11 As he
highlights, NGOs provide an opportunity for local staff to experience other cultures and an
international community through working regionally and travelling internationally. These
opportunities provided by NGOs benefit the people working for the organization at the country
offices. A doctor working at a French NGO explained the dichotomy of the humanitarian aid
apparatus,
One is these are good jobs for the local guys. So, in a lot of places, more MSF or even
some of the others, people are pulled in. So, we were in North Kivu, people were pulled
in from Goma. We were in Aweil, people were pulled in from Juba. Um, and they're
good paying jobs. So, they're not going to rock the boat. (Interview on 2 February 2021)
Many local staff benefit from higher pay and better capacity to treat patients, but dependency
structures are also in place, particularly when “The [expat] guy that's there, telling them that they
suck and only he can do the operations, which isn't true at all.” While there are issues inherent in
the system, organizations “are providing money and jobs. And they are helping out. They are
providing some training. Some of the local guys end up becoming expats in other countries, so
that's good. Um, so you know, it's not all bad. It's sort of complicated.” By working with and
training local staff, capacities are increased, and doctors are able to grow as doctors. Both
participants touch on the opening of international opportunities provided by NGOs, which was
likely much less accessible before. The international aid apparatus is inherently complicated.
While there are many benefits for local populations, the space for humanitarian aid organizations
is shrinking as local capacities are growing and as conflicts are becoming more dangerous and

“There is a good relationship, the quality of work. There is a good relationship between teams. There already…
that permits a spirit of opening… many regions, many conferences.” (translation by author)
11
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less localized.
A Local Perspective on Action contre la faim
The wide range of opinions toward NGOs exhibited in this chapter show the complicated
and often contradictory nature of the humanitarian assistance sector. Even those who assert that
NGOs contribute to the neo-colonial structure present in Africa recognize that there are good
elements to the work that NGOs do. However, one subject told a story that has “been told so
many times in ACF, it has kind of become lore.” While working in the country office in Senegal
in 2010, there was a warehouse manager who was being promoted to a position in the logistics
department. The interview was a formality because the man had worked with the organization
forever, and:
At one point, you know, someone asked… in the interview [and they were] like, just, you
know, an easy question, okay? Is what alright, so what are the letters ACF stands for?
And, you know, and he responded with without missing a fucking beat, responded,
Afrique Coloniale Française. Well, no one ever had the courage to ask… Like, are you
joking? (Interview on 5 February 2021a)
This story illustrates a local perspective on the ACF and the wider apparatus in general. The
interview participant describes a portion of the population that is nostalgic for the colonial
period. This story illustrates that NGOs are viewed, at least to some local staff, as contributing to
the neo-colonial project.
Conclusion
This chapter addresses some of the more human elements in humanitarian work, as well
as questions confronting the sector as the international structure becomes more complex in the
decades after the end of the Cold War. The two previous chapters analyze how donor funding
and bureaucratization reproduce and uphold neo-colonial structures, like a dependency on
Western aid. In this chapter, I focus on the promotion of Western superiority, the devaluation of
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local expertise, and questions for NGOs in the future. Neo-colonial values that uphold ideas
Western superiority contribute to the overall neo-colonial structure that was discussed in the
previous chapters.
In looking at observation implications for this chapter, many were found to exist. First,
this chapter found instances where Western values were imposed upon local communities. While
not always overt, the strong belief within the humanitarian aid sector that expatriate knowledge
outweighs local expertise promotes Western superiority. However, many participants pointed to
the fact that country level offices are always respectful of the local culture, especially because
they generally employ local staff. The larger NGO apparatus seems to value Western superiority
and pushes Western values, such as human rights. This chapter also outlined many instances
where NGOs were found to be insensitive to local culture. Even though several participants
pointed to country level sensitivity to local culture through respecting local religious holidays,
there were issues with expatriate staff and the larger structure itself. While some participants
pointed to specific issues with insensitive expatriates, there were also structural factors that
enabled insensitivity, discrimination, and racism. Instances of insensitivity by expatriate staff
reflect a larger neo-colonial system that prioritizes Western knowledge and power. Many
participants, particularly in the medical NGO field, spoke to the lack of training for local
populations. This was occasionally mission dependent, with some missions focusing more on
training and others dismissing local expertise and going in to do as much as possible. Finally,
when looking at decreases in local funding, this chapter found instances where a project
detracted from the local capacity to provide for their own hospitals and clinics by hiring local
doctors and staff. However, no participants spoke to changes in local funding practices for
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infrastructure like hospitals and schools. This chapter has highlighted some of the human
elements that also work to uphold neo-colonial values and structure systems.

Chapter 5: Conclusion
This thesis began with a question about the role and actions of French NGOs in
Francophone West Africa and whether or not they contribute to neo-colonial structures. This
project set out to better understand how French NGOs operate globally with particular attention
to the Françafrique regime. Through an analysis of donor funding and bureaucratization, this
project outlined structural factors inherent in the INGO system that benefits Western liberal
institutions. In Chapter 4, I looked at some of the consequences of these structural problems, as
well as how participants viewed the existence of these organizations in the future. As this project
has shown, French NGOs uphold and reinforce neo-colonial structure systems in Francophone
West Africa. In this final chapter, I review how all these factors contribute to neo-colonialism, as
well as proposing areas for further research.
Through a thorough analysis of donor funding practices, this project aimed to understand
if and in what ways donor funding contributed to neo-colonialism. Chapter 2 focuses on donor
funding practices and uses four observable implications to evaluate the links between donor
funding and neo-colonialism. The chapter focuses on lack of technological development,
earmarked funding toward specific projects, INGOs receiving the majority of funding from large
donors, and upward accountability to donors over accountability to beneficiaries. Through an
analysis of participant responses, all four observable implications were upheld.
Donor funding created poor incentive structures for technological advancement, and
many participants spoke to funding being allocated to specific projects. Earmarked funding
restricts NGO flexibility to pursue actions it deems necessary, but it also imposes the donor’s
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agenda onto NGOs. Additionally, it is nearly impossible for local NGOs to access funds from
large international donors, which requires them to contract with large INGOs for access funding.
This hierarchical structure places donors above INGOs and local NGOs, with local NGOs at the
bottom. Finally, NGOs were more likely to use upward accountability measures towards donors
through annual reports and publishing financial reports. Only a few participants mentioned
accountability measures towards beneficiaries, as these mechanisms remain underdeveloped and
are often just seen as “box-ticking.” To supplement these observable implications and interview
data, Chapter 2 also included data from the European Commission's ECHO. This data highlights
the proportion of ECHO and French funding going to Francophone West Africa and to French
NGOs in Francophone West Africa. Interestingly, France granted large quantities of funding to
different French Embassies in Francophone West Africa, as well as to the French Commune of
Chambéry. Thus, through a system that relies on donor funding, NGOs become reliant on
international aid from primarily Western donors. The reliance translates to a lack of
technological development and asymmetrical payout for beneficiaries. Because NGOs rely so
heavily on donor funding to continue operations, they become more accountable to donors than
to beneficiaries.
Chapter 3 presents an analysis of bureaucratization within the French NGO sector, which
is matched by the growth in size and administration of these organizations. As INGOs are
increasing in size, their administration and bureaucracy grow with it. As a result, many INGOs
are composed of many affiliates that interact almost independently from each other under the
mission and direction of one international office. This chapter also finds that large INGOs
operate similarly to large businesses and corporations--truly accepting a complicated globalized
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structure. In this chapter, I identified three observable implications by which to measure the
relationship between bureaucratization and neo-colonialism.
By examining whether there was a lack of exit strategy, disconnect between staff working
in the field and staff working in headquarters, and career humanitarian aid workers, I was able to
understand the bureaucratic nature of these organizations. Many subjects spoke of a lack of exit
strategy with NGOs continuing missions for as long as funding is available. However, subjects
also spoke of large gaps created by the departure of an NGO. There was also evidence of a
disconnect between administration and field work, with decisions made at headquarters often
being unpopular on the ground. Finally, there was evidence of career humanitarian aid workers,
with variation across different organizations. However, a few subjects spoke of volunteers
moving into administrative roles after completing a few missions. Thus, this growth in the size
and administration of French NGOs relates to greater control and access to funding, but also to a
larger disconnect between field staff and headquarters. Chapter 3 found substantial evidence to
point to an increase in bureaucratization leading to the upholding of neo-colonial structures.
Outside of the two hypotheses discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, many participants
spoke of experiences with insensitivity and discrimination, as well as questions for the future of
NGOs. To analyze this data, I looked at four observable implications to test how these factors
relate to neo-colonial structures and values. I found there to be instances of impositions of
Western values, particularly an emphasis on the superiority of Western knowledge. There were
also many participants who spoke about insensitivity, not always to local culture, but toward
local populations and capacities. This insensitivity often rested with particular expatriate staff,
but the overall NGO apparatus does little to train and dissuade these instances of insensitivity.
Many participants also spoke about a lack of training provided for the local population,
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particularly in the medical field. This lack of training often coincided with the belief that local
staff were not capable of doing these complex operations, which relates back to the stated belief
in expatriate superiority. Finally, this project did not find instances where local funding for
projects, like health care or education, were decreased. However, many participants spoke to
NGO projects taking local staff or pulling patients from existing facilities, which inhibits local
infrastructure and creates dependency. These factors contribute to the perpetuation of neocolonial structures and values, even though they rest outside my two hypotheses. Chapter 4 also
elaborates on why it is important to look at the human elements within these structures to better
understand how the system affects staff and beneficiaries.
In conclusion, this project presents evidence that French NGOs perpetuate neo-colonial
structures and values of Western superiority in Francophone West Africa. Through the use of
interview data and data from the European Commission’s ECHO, this project was able to find
evidence that these structures persist in the region with French NGOs aiding in the maintenance
and growth of dependency structures through funding and large administrative capacities, while
also contributing to building up Western knowledge at the detriment to local expertise. While
this project outlines many important phenomena within French NGOs, many of these trends are
not unique to French NGOs and Francophone West Africa. Rather, they extend the entire
humanitarian aid sector. The dependency structures are created through asymmetrical power and
an emphasis on Western knowledge and economies. Thus, the French NGOs work within a
larger system that contributes to creating dependency, namely governmental and multinational
interests. While presented as benevolent and apolitical institutions, NGOs work within a complex
political global organization.

100

This thesis attempts to understand to what extent French NGOs uphold neo-colonial
values and structures, but there are many areas for further study that may elucidate the
complexities of this phenomenon. First, it would be interesting to study how the complex
administrative structures of INGOs contributes to neo-colonial activity and whether this growth
has any quantifiable benefits for beneficiaries. This field of research could also benefit from a
study into how different branches of the same organization operate on the global scale, and
whether they are more autonomous or guided under the framework from the international
headquarters. In looking at how neo-colonialism is perpetuated through NGOs and their work to
distribute aid, it would be interesting to study local NGOs and efforts to break from this rigid
structure. Can local NGOs find alternative sources of funding that do not impose the same
restrictions as Western donors? In looking more into this area of study, it could be possible to
find ways to break these ties that perpetuate neo-colonialism and create something new in its
place.
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Appendix: Interviews
1. Nigerian NGO worker. Interviewed on 1 February 2021.
2. American surgeon NGO worker. Interviewed on 2 February 2021.
3. Senegalese staff at British NGO in the country office. Interviewed on 4 February 2021.
4. Former French-American NGO worker in West Africa. Interviewed on 5 February 2021.
5. American OB-GYN and former NGO worker. Interviewed on 5 February 2021.
6. American OB-GYN and former NGO worker. Interviewed on 10 February 2021.
7. Italian pediatrician and NGO worker. Interviewed on 1 March 2021.
8. Senegalese staff in French NGO at country office. Interviewed on 16 March 2021.
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